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TANGLED UP IN KNOTS:
HOW CONTINUED FEDERAL JURISDICTION
OVER SEXUAL PREDATORS ON INDIAN
RESERVATIONS HOBBLES EFFECTIVE
LAW ENFORCEMENT TO THE
DETRIMENT OF INDIAN WOMEN
Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne*

INTRODUCTION
In February 2003, twenty-year-old Leslie Ironroad lapsed into a
coma and died after being held captive in a bathroom, then beaten and
repeatedly raped by a group of men on the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in South Dakota.1 Desperate to stop the assault, Ironroad had
taken diabetes pills she found in the bathroom’s medicine cabinet, hoping
that the men would stop their assault if she became unconscious.2 Later,
from her hospital bed, Ironroad described her attack to a police officer.3
She named her assailants.4 She named witnesses to the attack.5 Black and
*
Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. B.A.
University of Maryland–College Park, 1999; J.D., University of California–Davis,
2002. Special thanks to Mercer alum Dallas Roper, who slipped an article on sexual
assault on Indian reservations under my office door, planting the seed for this article.
Thanks to Professors Anthony Baldwin, Linda Berger, Theodore Blumoff, Linda
Jellum, David Oedel, Jack Sammons, Karen Sneddon, and Scott Titshaw for their
constructive comments and suggestions in the early stages of this article. Thanks also
to Professor Robert J. Miller for his helpful advice and suggestions. This article has
been helped immeasurably by all of their insights and I very much appreciate the
generosity of their time. I would also like to thank Kirsten Netterblad for providing
valuable feedback, which helped improve this article. I am also grateful for the
excellent research assistance of Mercer law students Kathleen S. Turnipseed and
Robert Matthew Shoemaker as well as University of Chicago student Cora Tench. I
also appreciate the generous financial assistance from the Mercer Law School. The
mistakes are mine.
1. All Things Considered: Rape Cases on Indian Lands Go Uninvestigated
(NPR radio broadcast July 25, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=12203114 [hereinafter Rape Cases Go Uninvestigated].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
239
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blue with bruises, she handwrote her statement.6 After her death, her
rape was never investigated.7 Her assailants were never questioned.8 No
one was prosecuted.9
After Ironroad’s death, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) police
chief responsible for investigating crimes at Standing Rock explained the
lack of investigation on an inability to substantiate the rape.10 Although
Ironroad had written out her own statement and had been interviewed by
a BIA officer, the BIA chief contended that the rape had not been reported.11 Nonetheless, four years later, reporters from National Public
Radio were able to piece together the story of what happened to
Ironroad that February night by examining Ironroad’s hospital records
and by interviewing hospital employees, police, medical examiners, and
other people familiar with her case.12 In one of those interviews, Doug
Wilkinson, the BIA officer who took Ironroad’s statement, explained why
many sexual assault cases occurring on the reservation were not investigated.13 According to Wilkinson, he was overworked and could not possibly keep up with all of the rapes, sexual assaults, and child abuse cases
reported each week at Standing Rock.14 Instead, forced to triage cases,
only those cases where a suspect confessed were referred to the U.S. Attorneys’ Office for prosecution.15 Other cases were forgotten—at least by
law enforcement, if not by the victims or their communities.16

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (“I looked back and there was nothing that could substantiate that happening. I’m sure she passed away, but as far as her being involved as a victim of sexual
assault, I couldn’t find anything to support that . . . . You know, if a person doesn’t
report, then how can we investigate it, if we don’t know about it?”).
12. Id.
13. Id. For further examples of the failure to investigate these crimes, see also
AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA (2007), available at http://www.amnesty
usa.org/women/maze/report.pdf [hereinafter MAZE OF INJUSTICE]; Bill Moyers Journal (PBS television broadcast Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/
journal/11142008/transcript2.html; Michael Riley, Lawless Lands: Promises, Justice
Broken, DENV. POST, Nov. 11, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter Justice Broken].
14. Rape Cases Go Uninvestigated, supra note 1. Wilkinson later left the BIA to
pursue a ministry so that he could help victims of violent crime. Id.
15. Id.; see also MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 13.
16. Rape Cases Go Uninvestigated, supra note 1. For more examples see also
MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 13; Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 13; Justice Broken, supra note 13.
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Ironroad’s story exemplifies all that is wrong with law enforcement
in Indian Country.17 Despite epidemic levels of sexual assaults against native women,18 tribal governments are largely powerless to prosecute offenders.19 The primary obstacle to enforcement is a confusing knot of
jurisdictional rules that impede available law enforcement resources and
that divest tribes of the authority to adequately prosecute those who victimize tribal citizens.20 Under federal law, tribal governments lack jurisdiction over most major crimes, including rape, that occur on reservation
land.21 Tribes have no jurisdiction over any crimes committed by non-Indians even though more than 80 percent of sexual assaults on tribal lands
are committed by non-Indians.22 As a result, tribal law enforcement officials must refer victims to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and

17.

“Indian country” is defined to include

(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian
titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.

18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
18. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a)(5)(A),
124 Stat. 2261, 2262 (2010) (finding that “domestic and sexual violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women has reached epidemic proportions”); see also
Amanda M.K. Pacheco, Broken Traditions: Overcoming the Jurisdictional Maze to
Protect Native American Women from Sexual Violence, 11 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES
1, 2–4 (2009); see generally MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 13; Rape Cases Go
Uninvestigated, supra note 1.
19. See § 202(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 2262; 155 CONG. REC. S4333 (daily ed. Apr. 2,
2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan); see generally MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra
note 13; Pacheco, supra note 18, at 23, 29; Rape Cases Go Uninvestigated, supra note
1.
20. § 202(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 2262; 155 CONG. REC. S4333 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009)
(statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan); AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA—ONE
YEAR UPDATE 9 (2008), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdf/maze_1yr.pdf
[hereinafter ONE YEAR UPDATE]; Troy A. Eid, Beyond Oliphant: Strengthening
Criminal Justice in Indian Country, FED. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2007, at 40, 42, 44.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); Eid, supra note 20, at 44.
22. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA, FOCUS SHEET—THE ROLE OF
SOVEREIGN TRIBAL AUTHORITY 1 (2007), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
women/maze/SovereignTribalAuthority.pdf [hereinafter SOVEREIGN TRIBAL AUTHORITY]; see also Pacheco, supra note 18, at 2; Ralph Blumenthal, For Indian Victims of Sexual Assault, a Tangled Legal Path, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, at A16.
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the U.S. Attorneys’ Office, where prosecution of sexual offenders who
commit crimes in Indian Country is nearly nonexistent.23
Consequently, tribal lands have become safe havens for sexual
predators, who can commit their offenses with little fear of prosecution.24
As Fort Peck Tribal Chairman A.T. “Rusty” Stafne explained, “Our people are afraid because there are persons committing crimes against us at
night and in broad daylight. . . . We have criminals that are simply
unafraid of prosecution.”25 Indeed, “[t]o a sexual predator, the failure to
prosecute sex crimes against American Indian women is an invitation to
prey with impunity.”26
Congress has responded to the epidemic of reservation crime with
the Tribal Law and Order Act27 (TLOA). But, as this article explains, the
TLOA is fundamentally flawed, and will likely do little to address the
underlying impediment to effective tribal law enforcement because it
leaves the prevailing jurisdictional confusion in place. Instead, I argue
that tribal governments will be able to adequately safeguard their citizens
only if Congress expands tribal jurisdiction to permit tribes to arrest and
prosecute all those who victimize tribal citizens. Part I discusses the legal
barriers that leave reservations and Indian women open to sexual
predators who have little fear of prosecution. Part II discusses the
TLOA’s provisions to improve tribal law enforcement. Part III concludes
that the TLOA does not go far enough to protect Indian women victimized by sexual assault. This article proposes instead that tribes need local
control over law enforcement to effectively safeguard their citizens. For
too long, tribes have been left powerless to defend their own people
against predators who enter reservation lands and commit unspeakable
violence against tribal citizens. At the heart of sovereignty is the responsibility of government to protect its citizens. It is time to permit tribes to
rise to this responsibility.

23. See, e.g., All Things Considered: Legal Hurdles Stall Rape Cases on Native
Lands (NPR radio broadcast July 26, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=12260610 [hereinafter Legal Hurdles].
24. Id. (quoting Chickasaw Tribal Police Chief explaining that “[m]any of the
criminals know Indian lands are almost a lawless community, where they can do
whatever they want”); see also 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. John Barrasso). Similarly, “drug cartels deliberately base their operations in Indian Country because of the lack of law enforcement.” 154 CONG. REC.
H8455 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2008) (statement of Rep. Herseth Sandlin).
25. ONE YEAR UPDATE, supra note 20, at 9.
26. SOVEREIGN TRIBAL AUTHORITY, supra note 22, at 2 (quoting Dr. David
Lisak, Assoc. Professor of Psychol., Univ. of Mass.); see also 155 CONG. REC. S4334
(daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. John Barrasso).
27. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258.

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX104.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 5

7-NOV-11

SEXUAL PREDATORS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS

14:04

243

I. LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A BIND: THE EPIDEMIC OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
Tragically, what happened to Leslie Ironroad is not unusual in Indian Country, where the criminal justice system is severely broken and
crime has created a public safety crisis.28 Criminal investigations are
delayed if they are pursued at all and serious felonies routinely escape
prosecution all together.29 As a consequence, Indian reservations have become prosecution-free zones where sexual predators can repeatedly victimize Indian women with impunity.30
A. An Epidemic of Crime in Indian Country
According to some authorities, violent crime rates range from two
to twenty times the national average depending on the reservation.31 Indeed, while crime outside Indian reservations has generally declined in
recent years, reservations have seen violent crime spiral upward over the
same time period.32 For sexual assaults, the number of reported cases is
staggering.33 By U.S. Department of Justice (Justice Department) esti-

28. 155 CONG. REC. S4333 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron
Dorgan); see also Justice Broken, supra note 13; Eid, supra note 20, at 42.
29. Justice Broken, supra note 13; see also MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 13, at
61–62.
30. Justice Broken, supra note 13; see also 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr.
2, 2009) (statement of Sen. John Barrasso) (“Criminal elements are well aware of the
conditions of near lawlessness in some reservation areas.”); Eid, supra note 20, at 40.
31. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S4333–44 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of
Sen. Byron Dorgan (“The violent crime rate in Indian country is nearly twice the
national average, and more than 20 times the national average on some reservations.”); STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME:
A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992–2002, at 4, 5 (2004), available at http://www.justice
.gov/otj/pdf/american_indians_and_crime.pdf (stating that the violent crime rate
among Native Americans is two and a half times the national average).
32. FBI, 2006 CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, TABLE 1 (2007), available at http://
www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_01.html. According to one reporter, between
2002 and 2006, homicides increased 14 percent on Indian reservations. Todd Richmond, Tribes, Police Band Together to Fight Drugs, Gangs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June
5, 2009. In the same period, robberies increased 123 percent. Id.
33. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 31, at 4, 5 (finding that Native Americans endure violent crimes at an average rate of 101 victims for every 1,000 persons and are
two times more likely to experience rape or sexual assault); PATRICIA TJADEN &
NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 22 (2000), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172837.pdf (finding that more than one-third of Native
American women likely to be raped); CALLIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION AND RACE, 1993–98, at 9 (2001), available at http://
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mates, one in three native women will be raped in her lifetime, nearly
twice the national average.34 Further, American Indian and Alaska Native women are two-and-a-half times more likely to be the victim of a
violent or sexual assault in their lifetimes than nonnative women.35
Tribal officials point out that the lack of prosecutions often permits
an escalation of criminal activity that results in increasingly violent behavior.36 It also leaves Indian women open to victimization by sexual
predators, the vast majority of whom are non-Indians who enter reservabjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vvr98.pdf (finding that 23.2 out of 100 Native
American women are victims of “intimate partner violence”).
34. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 33, at 22 (chart detailing percentages of
persons victimized by rape in their lifetime by gender). In contrast, one in five women
in the United States will be raped in her lifetime. Id. Rates of sexual assault on Alaska
Native women are even more staggering. According to one study, Alaska Native women in Anchorage were ten times more likely to be sexually assaulted than nonnative
women. ANDRÉ ROSAY, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA, JUSTICE CENTER, DESCRIPTIVE
ANALYSIS OF SEXUAL ASSAULTS IN ANCHORAGE, ALASKA: 2002/2003 UPDATE 7–8
(2006).
35. Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, U.S. House to Hear Testimony on Sexual Violence Against Native American and Alaska Native Women (Mar. 24, 2009), http://
www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGUSA20090324002&lang=E. Since 1991,
Alaska Native women have comprised nearly 80 percent of victims of rape and murder in that state. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT
INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(2007), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/maze/exec%20summary.pdf
[hereinafter Executive Summary]. The crimes committed are horrific. The first Native
Anchorage Police officer explained that in her decade on the police force, she had lost
count of the number of Alaska Native women raped and murdered. All Things Considered: Rapes, Abuse High for Indigenous U.S. Women (NPR radio broadcast April
24, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9803207
[hereinafter Rapes High for Indigenous Women]. In many cases, the victims were tortured and beaten to death in addition to being raped. Id. Moreover, in many cases,
these murders were not reported even by those who saw the victims’ bodies. Id. Even
though Alaska Native women account for less than 10 percent of Anchorage’s population, they account for more than half of all women sexually assaulted each year in
Anchorage. ROSAY, supra note 34, at 8.
36. Rapes High for Indigenous Women, supra note 35. For instance, a tribal
prosecutor sought the help of federal prosecutors to stop a serial rapist preying on
women on the Fort Berthold Reservation. Michael Riley, Principles, Politics Collide,
DENV. POST, Nov. 13, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter Principles, Politics]. The suspect had
committed two rapes at Fort Berthold and was a suspect in a rape that had occurred a
decade earlier on another reservation. Id. Without jurisdiction, tribal prosecutors
could do nothing to investigate the pattern. Id. Federal prosecutors never responded.
Id. Three years later, just after the case was closed by tribal prosecutors, the rapist
struck again, abducting a woman who leapt from the vehicle to escape her attacker.
Id. She spent the night outside in frigid temperatures before she was able to reach
safety. Id.
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tion lands to commit their crimes.37 According to the Justice Department,
86 percent of sexual assaults against Indian women are perpetrated by
non-Indian men.38 This contrasts markedly with the U.S. population as a
whole, where both victim and perpetrator are most often of the same
racial or ethnic group.39
Of course, Justice Department statistics cannot account for the number of sexual assaults that go unreported. Research conducted by Amnesty International reveals that, similar to nonnative women, Indian
women are assaulted at rates much higher than suggested by police reports.40 Nevertheless, the fact that women do not report being assaulted
should be regarded as another failure of law enforcement.41 Discouraged
by the lack of law enforcement protection, Indian women do not report
rapes and other sexual assaults “because of the belief that nothing will be
done.”42 They are told by relatives and friends that no one will prosecute
the rape of an Indian woman.43 This belief is reinforced by the fact that
the majority of reported assaults are ignored, with little or no investigation or prosecution.44

37. See Pacheco, supra note 18, at 3 (“Tribes were once able and willing to deal
with perpetrators of violence against women, and . . . the tribes’ ability to enforce
their laws bred a culture where women were safe.”).
38. PERRY, supra note 31, at 22.
39. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2006 STATISTICAL TABLES 30 (2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cvus0602.pdf.
40. According to a recent Amnesty International study, Native American women are sexually assaulted at rates higher than indicated by federal statistics. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 35, at 2. Amnesty International researched sexual
violence in Indian Country in 2005 and 2006 in consultation with American Indians
and Alaska Natives. Id. In conducting this research, Amnesty International focused
on Oklahoma, the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation, and Alaska, interviewing victims of sexual assault and their families, tribal law enforcement officials, and support
workers. Id. Amnesty International also interviewed federal and state law enforcement officials. Id.
41. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 13 (noting that indigenous women are
often deterred from reporting sexual assault).
42. SOVEREIGN TRIBAL AUTHORITY, supra note 22, at 1; see also Blumenthal,
supra note 22.
43. Legal Hurdles, supra note 23. Indian woman recounted being raped by four
white men when she was fourteen-years-old. Id. Following the advice of her mother
and relatives—and believing that no one would take her word against five white
men—she never reported the crime and the perpetrators were left free to commit
more offenses. Id.
44. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 35, at 1.
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Often, women who do report being raped are turned away or not
believed.45 One woman reported being raped by three men who held her
captive for three days.46 Police dismissed her report, labeling the rape
“consensual sex” and explaining that she would not be believed with
three witnesses against her.47 The victim stated, “I had cigarette burns on
me, and they called it consensual.”48 Even when a report is taken seriously, long delays in investigations can leave reservation residents demoralized.49 All too often, victims receive no information about what, if any,
progress is being made on pursuing their attackers.50 These delays, which
allow perpetrators to prey on more victims, can increase the likelihood of
reprisals against victims and witnesses.51 Consequently, in those cases
when prosecutions are finally pursued years later, victims often decline to
press charges.52 Furthermore, long delays by federal agents can thwart the
ability of tribal prosecutors to pursue even weak misdemeanor charges as
investigations drag past the relevant statute of limitations.53
High rates of crime and weak attempts at prosecution combine to
create a lawlessness on reservations that undermines tribal communities
and that leaves Indian women at risk. Since their crimes are either not
reported or not prosecuted, sexual predators are free to offend again and
again in a upward spiral of crime and violence. Consequently, many Indians believe that the justice system neither serves nor protects them.54
Crime victims feel trapped in their homes, fearful of repeated attacks.55
Other families, no longer feeling safe on the reservation, opt to leave.56
B. A Jurisdictional Knot
The primary stumbling block to investigating and prosecuting a
crime committed in Indian Country is a complex jurisdictional knot that
is more likely to thwart justice than to serve it.57 These rules are a conse-

45. Blumenthal, supra note 22.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Justice Broken, supra note 13.
50. MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 13.
51. Id.
52. Justice Broken, supra note 13.
53. Id.
54. Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 13.
55. Justice Broken, supra note 13.
56. Id.
57. “Jurisdiction in ‘Indian country,’ which is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, . . . is
governed by a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law.” Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676, 680 n.1 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as
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quence of treaties, federal statutes, regulations, executive orders, and
caselaw that have combined to create confusing overlaps of authority in
some instances and jurisdictional gaps in others.58 Proving that more law
does not necessarily make more justice, overly complex jurisdictional
rules have largely stripped tribal governments of their ability to police
their own communities. Instead, that authority is delegated to federal or
state officials who are largely “unaccountable to the communities for
whom they ostensibly work” or “simply unfamiliar with the legal, cultural, and geographic terrain.”59
It didn’t start out this way. In the earliest Supreme Court cases addressing jurisdiction over crimes in Indian Country, the Court sided with
tribal jurisdiction. For instance, in 1832 the Court held that tribes had
authority over their own land and that the laws of the state where a tribe
was located did not apply on tribal lands, even to non-Indians.60
Fifty years later, the Court reinforced its commitment to tribal jurisdiction in Ex parte Crow Dog.61 In that case the Court held that tribes had
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over tribal members for offenses committed on tribal lands. The case involved the murder of Spotted Tail, a Brule
Sioux Indian, by another Sioux, Crow Dog.62 Following the murder, which
occurred on tribal lands, the Tribe punished Crow Dog according to tribal
law, requiring him to pay restitution and to support Spotted Tail’s family.63 Dissatisfied with the Tribe’s punishment, the BIA pursued federal
prosecution.64 After a trial in the District Court of the Dakota Territory,
Crow Dog was found guilty and sentenced to death.65 Crow Dog filed a

stated in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.01, at 730 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2005); EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY, supra note 35, at 2–3; Johnson, supra 31; Shelley Bluejay Pierce, Tribes
Helped With Preventing Violent Crimes Against Women, NATIVE AMERICAN TIMES,
Apr. 3, 2009. Another problem is chronic underfunding and the need to build strong
tribal economies to support an effective and comprehensive tribal law enforcement
system, but that is a subject for another article.
58. See Davis & Washburn, supra note 34, at 4; Pacheco, supra note 18, at 3; Eid,
supra note 20, at 42, 44.
59. Davis & Washburn, supra note 34, at 4.
60. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832). Indeed, states were considered a deadly enemy of Indians. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
61. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
62. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557, 572; Pacheco, supra note 18, at 25 (providing
background to relationship between Crow Dog and Spotted Tail).
63. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557, 572; Pacheco, supra note 18, at 25 (providing
background on punishment imposed by Tribe).
64. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557, 572; Pacheco, supra note 18, at 25.
65. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572; Pacheco, supra note 18, at 25 (explaining sentencing by territorial court).
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petition for habeas corpus, challenging his conviction on the ground that
territorial courts lacked jurisdiction over a crime committed in Indian territory by one Indian against another.66 According to Crow Dog, neither
federal nor territorial law applied to him.67 Rather, he was subject only to
the jurisdiction of his Tribe.68 For its part, the United States contended
that the Sioux Treaty of 1868 and other federal statutes conferred criminal jurisdiction over Sioux lands to the United States.69
In granting Crow Dog’s petition, the Supreme Court held that the
federal government lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Crow Dog.70 Agreeing with Crow Dog, the Court held that jurisdiction resided with the
Sioux and that Crow Dog was subject only to tribal law.71 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied in part on a provision in the 1868 Treaty that
provided that Congress would “secure to [the Tribe] an orderly government.”72 For the Court, this pledge “necessarily implied” that Congress
was to ensure the tribes’ right “of self-government, the regulation by
themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and
peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws
and customs.”73 To ensure order and peace, the Tribe needed proper jurisdiction to punish the murder of one tribal member by another.74
In holding that the Tribe had exclusive jurisdiction, the Court found
its opinion reinforced by the distinct “nature and circumstances of th[e]
case.”75 Of particular importance to the Court was the limited jurisdiction
of the territorial court and that the case concerned “life and death.”76
Given the weighty matter, the Court was unsettled by the federal government’s attempt to extend its laws “by argument and inference only.”77 In
particular, the Court expressed concern with subjecting Indians to laws
which they had no role in drafting and that grew out of a different culture
and context than their own.78 According to the Court, permitting federal
jurisdiction would permit the extension of federal criminal law

66. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557, 572; Pacheco, supra note 18, at 25 (discussing
Crow Dog’s petition).
67. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 562–63.
70. Id. at 572.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 568.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 557, 572.
75. Id. at 571.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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over aliens and strangers; over the members of a community separated by race, by tradition,. . .from the authority and power which
seeks to impose upon them the restraints of an external and unknown code, . . . according to rules and penalties of which they
could have no previous warning; which judges them by a standard
made by others, and not for them. . . . It tries them, not by their
peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their
land, but by . . . a different race, according to the law of a social
state of which they have an imperfect conception, and which is
opposed to the traditions of their history, to the habits of their
lives . . . .79

Especially significant to the Court was a history of government policy that had sought to regulate crimes by Indians against non-Indians or
by non-Indians against Indians, but which had left crimes by Indians
against each other to “each tribe [to deal with] for itself, according to its
local customs.”80 Viewing tribes as “semi-independent,” federal law
“ha[d] always recognized [tribes] as exempt from our laws, whether
within or without the limits of an organized State or Territory, and, in
regard to their domestic government, left to their own rules and traditions.”81 The Court was reluctant to reverse this “uniform” policy without
an express act of Congress.82 Because Congress had not expressly done
so, the Tribe retained exclusive jurisdiction to punish an offender.83 Nevertheless, the Court recognized that Congress possessed the authority to
confer jurisdiction on federal courts.84
Congress responded to Crow Dog by passing the Major Crimes Act
(MCA) in 1885.85 The MCA granted federal jurisdiction over certain major crimes committed by Indians in Indian Country.86 The enumerated
crimes include major felonies such as murder, kidnapping, rape, and sexual assault.87 Just three years after Crow Dog, the Supreme Court upheld
79. Id.
80. Id. at 572.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 561–62.
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); see also Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205,
209–12 (1973) (noting that Major Crimes Act was Congress’s response to Crow Dog);
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.04, at 759 (citing WILLIAM A. BROPHY &
SOPHIE D. ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 48–49 (1966));
Pacheco, supra note 18, at 25–26.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1153; see Pacheco, supra note 18, at 26.
87. Specifically, the MCA grants federal jurisdiction over the following offenses:
[M]urder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A,
incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
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the authority of Congress to regulate crime occurring within tribal lands
under the MCA.88
Further, although the MCA applies only to Indian defendants,
under the Indian Country Crimes Act (ICCA) of 1854,89 the federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute all violations of “the general laws of
the United States” in Indian Country committed either by or against a
non-Indian.90 ICCA was designed to address “interracial crime,” that is,
where the perpetrator is Indian and the victim is not, or where the victim
is Indian, but the perpetrator is not.91 When both perpetrator and victim
are non-Indian, state jurisdiction applies.92 Nor does ICCA apply to ofweapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of
this title), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16
years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony
under section 661 of this title within the Indian country . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
88. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); accord Roberts, supra note
31, at 539. In United States v. Kagama, the Court held that Congress validly exercised
its “plenary power” over Indian tribes in passing the MCA. 118 U.S. at 384–85. According to the Court, because Congress had declared that it would no longer treaty
with Indian tribes, the tribes were no longer to be viewed as independent sovereign
nations. Id. at 382. Thus, like its authority to regulate the territories, Congress had
authority to regulate Indian Country by virtue of federal “ownership of the country in
which the territories [we]re, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in
the national government, and can be found nowhere else.” Id. at 380. Furthermore,
Indian tribes were “within the geographical limits of the United States.” Id. at 379.
And, those within those limits, “[we]re under the political control of the Government
of the United States, or of the States of the Union. There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two.” Id. Rather than independent sovereigns, “Indian
tribes are the wards of the nation . . . dependent on the United States . . . for their
political rights” and for protection from the states. Id. at 383–84. Along with this
federal “duty of protection” came a power that “has always been recognized by the
Executive, and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.” Id.
at 384. Under this reasoning, congressional authority to regulate the tribes’ internal
affairs existed “because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never
been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.” Id. at 384–85;
see also L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 827–28 (1996).
89. Also known as the General Crimes Act. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note
57, § 9.02, at 731.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).
91. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.02, at 734.
92. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881); accord COHEN’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.02, at 738, § 9.03, at 754–56; Roberts, supra note 31, at
539. In McBratney, the Supreme Court held that although ICCA vested jurisdiction
with the United States over crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indians,
upon statehood that jurisdiction was assumed by the new state. 104 U.S. at 624 (find-
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fenses committed by one Indian against another Indian or to those crimes
committed by an Indian against a non-Indian where the tribe has already
imposed punishment.93
For their part, tribes have jurisdiction over any crime committed by
an Indian against another Indian person or against Indian-held property
within Indian Country.94 Whether that jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent depends on the particular offense committed.95 A tribe has concurrent jurisdiction over offenses that fall under ICCA.96 Further, a tribe has
exclusive jurisdiction over those offenses not listed in the MCA when
committed by an Indian in Indian Country, except in those states where
Public Law 280 applies.97
It is less settled whether tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over Indian offenders for those offenses that are enumerated in the MCA.98 The
ing State of Colorado had jurisdiction over prosecution of murder of non-Indian by
non-Indian on Ute reservation); accord Roberts, supra note 31, at 539. For a brief
discussion of the Court’s questionable statutory interpretation in McBratney, see COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 6.01, at 506 n.59. According to the Court, state
jurisdiction was necessary as the tribe would not be interested in prosecuting a crime
that did not involve its own members. See id. § 9.03, at 755.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1152; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, at § 9.02, 738, 741.
94. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328–29 (1978), superseded by
statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), as recognized by United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193
(2004) (holding that tribes’ retained sovereignty permits them to prosecute Indian
offenders); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (2006), as stated in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004)); see also
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.04, at 756.
95. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.03, at 756.
96. See id. at 758.
97. Generally, states do not have jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians
on tribal land. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993). Under the MCA
and ICCA, federal jurisdiction is exclusive of state jurisdiction. See United States v.
John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 (1978); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.03, at
756–57. Thus, when either of these statutes apply, the state has no jurisdiction over
the offense. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.03, at 754. An exception to the
general rule are the five states governed by Public Law 280, which grants them jurisdiction to prosecute crimes on Indian reservations regardless whether the perpetrator
or victim are Indian. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 25 U.S.C.); accord Pacheco, supra note
18, at 31–32. Under Public Law 280, tribes and states share concurrent jurisdiction
over crimes committed in Indian Country by Indians. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra
note 57, § 9.03, at 754; accord Pacheco, supra note 18, at 31. Another exception would
be those tribes subjected to state law by a specific congressional action. See, e.g., Kansas Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (2006) (granting Kansas jurisdiction over offenses on Indian
reservations).
98. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.04, at 758 (citing Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1978), superseded in part by statute,
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Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that the MCA makes federal jurisdiction exclusive of tribal and state jurisdiction.99 More recently, however,
the Ninth Circuit in Wetsit v. Stafne directly addressed the question and
reached the opposite conclusion.100 In that case, Georgia Leigh Wetsit, a
member of the Fort Peck Tribe, sought habeas relief after being convicted
in tribal court for manslaughter.101 Because she had been tried and acquitted in federal court, Wetsit challenged her tribal conviction on the ground
that the MCA divested the Tribe of jurisdiction over the killing of her
common-law husband, who was also a member of the Tribe.102
Relying on United States v. Wheeler,103 the circuit court held that the
Tribe retained concurrent jurisdiction under the MCA.104 Although
Wheeler concerned an issue of double jeopardy not present in Wetsit, the
court was guided by Wheeler’s conclusion “that the tribes had not given
up their power to prosecute their members for tribal offenses ‘by virtue
of their dependent status.’”105 Rather, in acting on that power, the Tribe
was “acting ‘as an independent sovereign.’”106 The court was further persuaded by the tribes’ persistent practice of prosecuting theft, which is included in the MCA as “larceny.”107 According to the court, tribal
prosecution was necessary because federal prosecution of larceny was
“virtually nonexistent.”108 Following this example, the court found that
the MCA “permits conviction of the lesser offenses included within the
crime specified, and to hold that the tribal jurisdiction is thereby pre-

25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as stated in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004)); see
also Pacheco, supra note 18, at 26–28.
99. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.04, at 759; see also Oliphant,
435 U.S. 191 (citing Felicia v. United States, 495 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1974) and Sam
v. United States, 385 F.2d 213, 214 (10th Cir. 1967)).
100. 44 F.3d 823, 825–26 (9th Cir. 1995); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra
note 57, § 9.04, at 759.
101. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL
232–58 (4th ed. 2004). For a discussion of Public Law 280, see Robert D. Cooter &
Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Rule of Custom in American Indian
Tribal Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287, 306–07 (1998).
102. Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 824.
103. 435 U.S. 313 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S. C. § 1301(2), as recognized by United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
104. Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 825; see also Roberts, supra note 31, at 541.
105. Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 825 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
106. Id. (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 329).
107. Id. (citing WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL
135 (2d ed. 1988)).
108. Id. (citing & quoting CANBY, supra note 107, at 35).
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empted would preempt a large part of a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction.”109
Noting that without tribal jurisdiction “many crimes on a reservation
would still go unpunished,” the court concluded that retention of “jurisdiction by the tribes can only increase their responsibility for efficient and
fair justice.”110
C. Hobbling Tribal Law Enforcement
Even assuming that tribal courts retain concurrent jurisdiction over
Indian defendants, the reality is that few major crimes have been prosecuted in tribal courts.111 One reason for this is that while a tribe might
prosecute a felony such as rape or murder, it can only subject those convicted to misdemeanor penalties.112 The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)
currently limits the criminal sentences that tribal courts can impose for
any one offense to one year and a fine of $5,000.113 Given those restrictions, tribes largely opt to forego prosecution.114 Moreover, because tribal
109. Id. at 826 (citing COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 339–41
(Rennard Strickland, ed. 1982)).
110. Id. at 825–26 (citing NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION, INDIAN COURTS IN THE FUTURE 33–35 (1978)).
111. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA: FOCUS SHEET—JURISDICTION
2 (2007), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/maze/JurisdictionFocussheet.pdf [hereinafter Jurisdiction].
112. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–03 (2006) (limiting tribal penalties to less than one year
incarceration and maximum $5,000 fine).
113. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7). While ICRA limits the tribe’s ability to incarcerate or
fine those convicted, it does not bar the tribe from imposing traditional tribal sanctions. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.09, at 769. Prior to European contact,
tribes did not imprison wrongdoers. Id. Rather, many tribes punished those who violated tribal rules with “[o]stracism, group disapproval, ridicule, religious controls . . . denial of privileges,” restitution and exile. Id. These punishments are not
consistently used today, with most tribes relying on fines and imprisonment. Id. The
tribe could also impose other sanctions such as community service or probation. Id.
Moreover, it was the distrust of tribal punishments that spurred Congress to move to
limit tribal jurisdiction. Id.; see also Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209–12
(1973) (noting that Congress passed Major Crimes Act in response to Crow Dog);
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.04, at 759 (citing WILLIAM A. BROPHY &
SOPHIE D. ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 48–49 (1966)).
114. CANBY, supra note 101, at 172 (“Even before passage of the [Indian] Civil
Rights Act, most tribes had left major crimes other than larceny entirely to the federal
government; with the Act’s sentencing limit they have little incentive to change that
pattern. Here as elsewhere tribes may choose to exercise less than their maximum
jurisdiction.”). Ironically, the limitations on tribal sentencing have been called on to
justify further incursions into tribal sovereignty. In 1968, Congress amended the MCA
to provide federal jurisdiction over assaults resulting in serious bodily injury. 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (2006) The inclusion of this offense was deemed necessary because
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jails are often underfunded, sentences are usually much shorter simply
because tribal jails lack bed space to hold offenders.115
Tribes have no jurisdiction to prosecute or punish non-Indian offenders, even for crimes occurring against Indians on tribal lands.116 In
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Suquamish Indian Provisional
Court attempted to prosecute two non-Indian residents of the Port
Madison Indian Reservation for misdemeanor offenses that occurred on
Reservation.117 The trial was halted when the two defendants, Mark Oliphant and Daniel Belgarde, sought habeas relief.118 In challenging their
prosecutions, the defendants argued that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians.119 For its part, the Tribe contended that its

[w]ithout this amendment an Indian can commit a serious crime and receive
only a maximum sentence of 6 months. Since Indian courts cannot impose
more than a 6-month sentence, the crime of aggravated assault should be
prosecuted in a Federal court, where the punishment will be in proportion to
the gravity of the offense.

Keeble, 412 U.S. at 211 n.10 (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-721, at 32 (1967)). ICRA’s limit
on tribal penalties has been criticized for implying that tribes are ill-equipped to handle anything but misdemeanor offenses. JURISDICTION, supra note 111, 3.
115. Principles, Politics, supra note 36; see also 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed.
Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan) (“The lack of jail bed space has
forced tribal courts to release a number of offenders.”).
116. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), superseded in part
by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as stated in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193
(2004); see also Roberts, supra note 31, at 540; Eid, supra note 20, at 44. Tribes do
retain the authority to exclude anyone, including non-Indians, from their reservations.
See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696–97 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (2006), as stated in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); see also
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57,
§ 9.09, at 769. This is true even if the tribe lacks criminal jurisdiction over the individual. Duro, 495 U.S. at 696–97. This principle does not apply in cases where the person
has a federal patent to fee land within tribal lands or where law enforcement officers
enter tribal lands to enforce violations that occurred off reservation, COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 4.01, at 220 (citing Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 363–64
(2001)), or where reservation roads are constructed with federal funds, as those roads
must be kept open to the public. Id. at 220 n.144. This suggests that a tribe could then
try a non-Indian for an offense as long as the only punishment is exile. Id. § 9.09, at
769.
117. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 193–94; Roberts, supra note 31, at 540. One defendant
had been charged with assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest. Oliphant, 435
U.S. at 194. The other defendant was charged with reckless endangerment and injury
to tribal property after he engaged police in a high-speed chase which ended when his
vehicle crashed into a tribal police vehicle. Id.
118. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
119. Id.
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jurisdiction over non-Indians stemmed from its “retained inherent powers of government over the Port Madison Indian Reservation.”120
The district court rejected Oliphant’s petition.121 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, relying on the Supreme Court’s recognition of Indian tribes as
“quasi-sovereign entities,” and explained that tribes, “though conquered
and dependent, retain those powers of autonomous states that are neither
inconsistent with their status nor expressly terminated by Congress.”122
Thus, tribal jurisdiction over persons committing crimes on the reservation were the “‘sine qua non’ of such powers.”123
In reversing, however, the Supreme Court invoked an historical
“unspoken assumption” held by all branches of the federal government
that tribes had no jurisdiction over non-Indians.124 This assumption
formed the basis for the Court’s conclusion that tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians would be “inconsistent with their status” as dependant nations.125 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the Treaty of
Point Elliott, in which the Suquamish “acknowledge[d] their dependence
on the government of the United States.”126 To the Court, “[b]y acknowledging their dependence on the United States, in the Treaty of Point Elliott, the Suquamish were in all probability recognizing that the United
States would arrest and try non-Indian intruders who came within their
Reservation.”127 Reading the Treaty with ICCA’s extension of federal enclave law into Indian Country, the Court held that tribes could not prosecute non-Indian offenders, but must instead deliver them to federal
authorities for prosecution.128
While the Oliphant Court acknowledged that the treaty provisions
would not be sufficient by themselves to divest tribes of jurisdiction over
non-Indians, it nevertheless went on to note that tribal jurisdiction could

120. Id. at 196 (internal quotations omitted).
121. Id. at 194–95.
122. Id. at 196 (citing Morton v. Mancari 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 196–205. The Court’s assumption is belied by the fact that by 1978,
approximately one-third of Indian tribes were exercising jurisdiction over nonmembers and non-Indians. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction Over
Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1055 (2005); see also
Roberts, supra note 31, at 541 (“[A]t the time [Oliphant] was decided, 33 of the 127
recognized tribes nationwide who exercised criminal jurisdiction extended that jurisdiction to cover non-Indians.”).
125. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (internal quotations omitted).
126. Id. at 207 (internal citations omitted).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 208.
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not lie absent an express grant of congressional authority.129 Although
tribes retained quasi-sovereign status, those retained powers were not
sufficient to permit jurisdiction without express delegation from Congress.130 Rather, “tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers
of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and
those powers ‘inconsistent with their status.’”131 That status, as independent nations, is “necessarily diminished” by virtue of being “a part of the
territory of the United States” and of holding and occupying reservations
with the assent and under the authority of the United States.132 According
to the Court, “[u]pon incorporation into the territory of the United
States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of
the United States and their exercise of separate power is constrained so
as not to conflict with the interests of this overriding sovereignty.”133 As a
consequence of their incorporation into the United States, tribes suffered
“inherent limitations” on their sovereignty.134 The “exercise of jurisdiction over non-Indian citizens of the United States would belie the tribes’
forfeiture of full sovereignty in return for the protection of the United
States.”135 Recognizing that crime by non-Indians on reservations was
widespread, the Court nevertheless held that this limitation meant that
tribal courts had no inherent jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians.136
Also important to the Court was the desire of Congress to protect
U.S. citizens from “unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.”137
Because tribes had submitted to the “overriding sovereignty of the
United States,” they had also ceded the authority to try non-Indians “except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”138 Invoking Crow Dog’s concern of subjecting one community’s laws to those who are strangers to
those laws, the Court expressed concern that non-Indians would be subjected to the law and procedure of tribal governments with which the
non-Indians were unfamiliar.139 The Court also feared that the full com-

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 209 (internal quotations omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 211.
136. Id. at 212. In so doing, the Court also rejected the expression of jurisdiction
by 33 of the 127 tribal court systems that also relied on retained sovereignty as the
basis to exert jurisdiction over all persons who committed offenses on tribal lands. See
id. at 196.
137. Id. at 210.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 210–11.
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plement of “basic criminal rights that would attach in non-Indian related
cases” would not be available in a tribal court.140 Thus, denying tribes the
authority to try and punish non-Indians would ensure against such intrusions.141 That tribes had begun to develop courts that more closely resembled the Anglo model did not alter the Court’s fundamental conclusion
that tribal courts would not adjudicate cases in an acceptable manner.142
After Oliphant, the Court found that tribes also lacked jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians—that is, over those Indians who were not also
members of the particular tribe asserting jurisdiction.143 Following its reasoning in Oliphant, the Court held in Duro v. Reina that tribal jurisdiction
over a nonmember constituted an “external” power that was likewise “inconsistent with the Tribe’s dependant status.”144 Rather, the tribe could
exert such authority only through an express congressional grant and subject to constitutional safeguards.145 That authorization came, however,
when Congress amended ICRA to permit tribal jurisdiction over all Indians as part of “the inherent power[s] of an Indian tribe.”146 Under this
“Duro-fix” nonmember Indians could be prosecuted by any tribe for offenses committed on tribal lands.147 However, tribes still lacked jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians, even those residing on reservation lands.
Despite its stated concern with imposing one community’s laws on
those who are strangers to those laws, the Court nonetheless upheld the
Duro-fix as a proper exercise of congressional authority.148 In United
States v. Lara, the petitioner contended that his federal prosecution vio-

140. Id. at 211.
141. See id. at 210. For a discussion of whether an individual is “Indian” for the
purposes of criminal prosecution, see Weston Meyring, “I’m an Indian Outlaw, Half
Cherokee and Choctaw”: Criminal Jurisdiction and the Question of Indian Status, 67
MONT. L. REV. 177 (2006).
142. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
143. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696–97 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (2006), as stated in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); see also Benjamin J. Cordiano, Unspoken Assumptions: Examining Tribal Jurisdiction over Nonmembers Nearly Two Decades after Duro v. Reina, 41 CONN. L. REV. 265, 265 (2008);
Roberts, supra note 31, at 549.
144. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686.
145. Id. at 684–86.
146. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006); see also Cordiano, supra note 143, at 266; Roberts, supra note 31, at 549.
147. § 1301(2)–(4); see also Cordiano, supra note 143, at 266; Roberts, supra note
31, at 544.
148. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); see also Samuel E. Ennis,
Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 553, 597–600 (2009).
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lated the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution149 because he
had already been subjected to tribal prosecution.150 In finding that the
subsequent federal prosecutions after a tribal prosecution did not run
afoul of the double jeopardy clause, the Court concluded that the prosecutions were undertaken by separate sovereigns.151 In so holding, the
Court rejected the argument that the tribe’s prosecution had been an exercise of delegated federal authority.152 Rather, the Court recognized that
a tribe’s authority to prosecute came from the tribe’s inherent tribal au-

149. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
150. Lara, 541 U.S. at 197; accord Roberts, supra note 31, at 530; Eric Wolpin,
Answering Lara’s Call: May Congress Place Nonmember Indians Within Tribal Jurisdiction Without Running Afoul of Equal Protection or Due Process Requirements?, 8
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1071, 1077 (2006). Lara also challenged his tribal conviction on
the ground that subjecting him to tribal prosecution violated the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Lara, 541 U.S. at 207–09. Specifically,
Lara argued that he was denied full protection of the Bill of Rights in a tribal court
proceeding in violation of due process. Id. He further contended that permitting tribal
jurisdiction over him on the basis of his status as an Indian regardless of his tribal
affiliation violated equal protection because it permitted nonmember Indians to be
treated differently than nonmember non-Indians. Id. at 209. The Court, however, refused to consider either claim as Lara had failed to raise them in the tribal court. Id.
Since neither issue had any bearing on the double-jeopardy issue that was before the
Court, the Court declined to consider these two issues. Id.
Nor has the Court considered the issue since. Indeed, the Court has declined to
review a case in which the Ninth Circuit found no equal protection violation. See
Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005). In that case, the Ninth Circuit,
holding that a nonmember Indian was subject to tribal jurisdiction, reasoned that by
criminal jurisdiction in the tribes over “all Indians,” ICRA applied to all persons of
Indian ancestry who were also Indians by political affiliation. Id. at 930. Thus, because
jurisdiction depended on a political rather than a racial classification, it did not violate
Means’ right to equal protection. Id. at 932.
151. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210; accord Roberts, supra note 31, at 531–32; Wolpin,
supra note 148, at 1077. The Court had reached a similar conclusion in United States v.
Wheeler, finding that tribal authority to prosecute comes from the tribes’ retained
sovereignty and not as a delegation of federal authority. United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S. C. § 1301(2), as recognized by United
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). Thus, double jeopardy did not prohibit the prosecution of a member Indian in federal court after tribal court prosecution for the same
offense. Id. at 330–31.
152. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210.
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thority.153 Accordingly, under the dual sovereignty doctrine,154 a subsequent federal prosecution did not violate double jeopardy.155
In summary, under current jurisdictional rules, appropriate jurisdiction depends on (1) whether the victim is an Indian; (2) whether the alleged perpetrator is an Indian;156 and (3) whether the offense took place
on tribal lands.157 Regardless whether the victim is an Indian, federal jurisdiction applies under the MCA when the perpetrator is an Indian accused of committing one of the MCA’s enumerated crimes in Indian
Country.158 When an offense is not listed in the MCA, federal jurisdiction
may still lie under ICCA when either—but not both—the victim or the
accused is an Indian and the offense is a federal crime committed in In153. Id.
154. The dual sovereignty doctrine provides that the prosecution of a defendant
for “a single act [that] violates the ‘peace and dignity’ of two sovereigns by breaking
the laws of each,” does not violate Double Jeopardy because the defendant is deemed
to have “committed two distinct ‘offences.’ ” Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)
(citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). The Supreme Court has
explained that
“An offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law.” Consequently, when the same act transgresses the laws of two sovereigns, “it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same
offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of
which he is justly punishable. . . . ”

Id. (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 19–20 (1852)).
155. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210. Double-jeopardy is also implicated when the successive prosecution is by a tribal court after a federal prosecution. COHEN’S HANDBOOK,
supra note 57, § 9.05, at 762. In such a case, the tribal court would not be bound by
the Bill of Rights, but by ICRA’s double-jeopardy provision as well as by any tribal
laws with respect to double jeopardy. Id. In any event, the same reasoning underpinning the dual sovereignty doctrine would likely apply absent a tribal decision to bar
dual prosecutions by separate sovereigns. See id.
156. Of course, one problem with this jurisdictional division is defining precisely
who is an “Indian.” Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 61, § 9.02, at 739–41 (federal
courts have created a two-part test to determine who is an “Indian” for criminal jurisdiction purposes). While it would apply to an enrolled member, what is less clear is
when the perpetrator is not enrolled, but still considered an Indian by the tribe. Id.
That question, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
157. Generally, states do not have jurisdiction over Indians on tribal land. An
exception to this rule are the five states governed by Public Law 280, which grants
them jurisdiction to prosecute crimes on Indian reservations regardless whether the
perpetrator or victim are Indian. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as
amended in scattered statutes of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 25 U.S.C.). Under Public
Law 280, tribes and states share concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian Country by Indians. Id. Another exception would be those tribes subjected to
state law by express congressional action. See supra note 97.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.02, at
742–43. “Indian” is defined at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (citing to 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
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dian Country.159 However, ICCA does not apply if the tribe has already
imposed punishment against an Indian offender.160 If neither the victim
nor the accused is Indian and the crime is not a federal offense, state
jurisdiction applies.161 Ultimately, this means that tribal jurisdiction applies only when the perpetrator is an Indian who committed an offense
not listed in the MCA against another Indian in Indian Country.162 Finally, tribal jurisdiction may or may not be concurrent depending on the
crime charged.163 Given this complexity, it is unsurprising that law enforcement in Indian Country is “broken.”164
II. PULLING THREADS: THE TRIBAL LAW AND
ORDER ACT OF 2010
Describing law enforcement in Indian Country as “a proven failure,” Senator Byron Dorgan166 introduced the Tribal Law and Order
165

159. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 6.01, at 509. Some state and federal
courts have applied United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882), to find that state
jurisdiction lies over “victimless” crimes committed in Indian Country by non-Indians.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.03, at 755. However, even if a crime lacks an
identifiable victim, federal jurisdiction is proper if the conduct impacts Indians or
their interests. Id. § 9.03, at 756 (citing, e.g., Memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Jurisdiction Over “Victimless” Crimes Committed by NonIndians, 6 INDIAN L. REP. K-15 (1979)).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.02, at 738,
741.
161. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 6.01, at 509–10.
162. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328–29, superseded by statute, 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2), as recognized by United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding
that tribes’ retained sovereignty permits them to prosecute Indian offenders); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as
stated in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK,
supra note 57, § 9.04, at 756.
163. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.04, at 756.
164. 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron
Dorgan) (referring to the justice system on tribal lands as “broken”); see Eid, supra
note 20, at 42, 44–46.
165. Mary Clare Jalonick, Justice Department Refuses to Release Indian Crime
Data, BISMARCK TRIB., Sept. 19, 2008.
166. Senator Dorgan is the Chair of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.
Press Release, U.S. S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, Legislation Would Strengthen Law &
Order in Indian Country (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://indian.senate.gov/news/
pressreleases/2009-04-03.cfm [hereinafter Dorgan Press Release April 2009]. Dorgan
was joined by Senators John Barrasso (R-WY), Max Baucus (D-MT), Jeff Bingaman
(D-NM), John Kyl (R-AZ), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Tim Johnson (D-SD), Maria
Cantwell (D-WA), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), John Thune (R-SD), John Tester (DMT), Mark Begich (D-AK), and Tom Udall (D-NM). Id. At the same time, Represen-

R

R

R
R

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX104.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 23

SEXUAL PREDATORS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS

7-NOV-11

14:04

261

Act (TLOA) in 2009 “to strengthen law enforcement and justice in Indian
communities.”167 Passed by Congress and signed into law in 2010, the
TLOA aims to address the failures that have permitted crime to flourish
on Indian reservations.168 Specifically, the TLOA seeks to “boost law enforcement efforts by providing tools to tribal justice officials to fight

tative Stephanie Herseth Sandlin introduced companion legislation in the House.
H.R. 1924, 111th Cong. (2009).
167. Dorgan Press Release April 2009, supra note 166. Throughout 2009, the Justice Department held a series “Tribal Nations Listening Conferences” in 2009. Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Associate Attorney General Tom Perrelli Announces
New Initiative on Tribal Justice in Indian Country (June 15, 2009), available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-aag-589.html. During these conferences, Justice
Department officials “confer[red] with tribal leaders on how to address the chronic
problems of public safety in Indian Country and other important issues affecting tribal communities.” Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
PLAN TO DEVELOP A TRIBAL CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION POLICY IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13175 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
documents/exec13175-consultation-policy.pdf [hereinafter Dep’t of Justice Jan. 27,
2010, Report]. At the conclusion of the series of meetings, the Attorney General instructed those U.S. Attorneys’ Offices serving Indian Country to meet annually with
tribal leaders, to develop operational plans for dealing with reservation crime, and to
make crimes against women in Indian Country a priority. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Attorney General Announces Significant Reforms to Improve Public Safety
in Indian Country (Jan. 11, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
January/10-ag-019.html [hereinafter Dep’t of Justice Jan. 11, 2010, Press Release];
Dep’t of Justice Jan. 27, 2010, Report, supra. Further, the Justice Department announced it would increase the budget for prosecution of crimes in Indian Country by
six million dollars. Dep’t of Justice Jan. 11, 2010, Press Release. Although current
staffing levels leave federal prosecutors overwhelmed and unable to prosecute more
than two-thirds of reservation crime, the Justice Department plans to hire thirty-five
additional prosecutors and twelve FBI victim specialists to serve the forty-four U.S.
Attorney districts that serve Indian Country. Dep’t of Justice Jan. 11, 2010, Press Release, supra. Further, the Justice Department will reorganize the Office of Tribal Justice to serve as the liaison between the Department and tribal governments. Dep’t of
Justice Jan. 27, 2010, Report, supra.
168. When Congress passed the TLOA it did so as an amendment to H.R. 725,
The Indian Arts and Crafts Amendment Act of 2010. The bill signed into law is substantially similar to S.B. 797 as introduced by Senator Dorgan in 2009, but there are
some significant differences. Compare S. 797, 111th Cong. § 501 (as introduced in the
Senate, Apr. 2, 2009), with Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211,
§ 251, 124 Stat. 2258, 2297–2299. Furthermore, the initial bill included more extensive
congressional findings, some of which are omitted from the final act’s list of findings.
Compare S. 797, 111th Cong., § 2 (as introduced in the Senate, Apr. 2, 2009), with
§ 202, 124 Stat. at 2262–63. Because these findings are nonetheless part of the act’s
legislative history, they are discussed in this article.
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crime in their own communities, improving coordination between law enforcement agencies, and increasing accountability standards.”169
A. Continuing Federal Jurisdiction Over Indian Country Crime
While the TLOA seeks to improve law enforcement on Indian reservations, it nonetheless leaves primary jurisdiction over reservation crime
in federal hands while seeking to improve cooperation between federal
and Indian law enforcement. To accomplish its goals, the TLOA requires
enhanced coordination and cooperation between the Justice Department,
the BIA, and tribal communities in the investigation and prosecution of
Indian Country crimes.170 For instance, the TLOA seeks to improve collection and sharing of reservation crime data and criminal history information among federal, state, and tribal law enforcement.171 It provides
tribal law enforcement with access to national crime databases, thereby
ensuring that tribal police have access to vital criminal history information about suspects.172 It also expands the authority of tribal police to investigate crimes by non-Indians through deputization agreements with
local or federal law enforcement agencies.173
To further facilitate federal-tribal cooperation, the TLOA requires
every federal district that includes Indian Country to appoint at least one
U.S. Attorney to serve as a tribal liaison to coordinate prosecution of
crimes occurring on Indian reservations.174 Tribal liaisons are also tasked
with developing relationships with reservation residents and facilitating
residents’ interactions with the federal justice system.175 Specifically, the
169. Dorgan Press Release April 2009, supra note 166. In drafting the TLOA, the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held eight hearings on crime in Indian Country.
155 CONG. REC. S4333 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
From those hearings, the Committee “found recurring themes of insufficient resources for law enforcement agencies, inadequate responses to criminal activity, and
ineffective communication and coordination.” Id. at S4344 (statement of Sen. John
Barrasso). The Committee consulted with law enforcement officials at the federal,
state, and tribal level as well as with judges, crime victims and advocates, public defenders, and prosecutors. Id. at S4334 (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan). From those
meetings, the Committee drafted a bill designed to encourage a more aggressive response to reservation crime. Dorgan Press Release April 2009, supra note 166.
170. 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron
Dorgan).
171. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 251, 124 Stat. 2258,
2297–99.
172. 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron
Dorgan).
173. § 222, 124 Stat. at 2272–74.
174. Sec. 213, § 13(b), 124 Stat. at 2268–69.
175. See sec. 213, § 13(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 2270.
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liaison is to develop and maintain communication between federal officials and tribal leaders, tribal justice officers, and victims’ advocates.176
Tribal liaisons will also provide technical assistance and training to tribal
officers on evidence gathering and techniques for victim and witness protection.177 Despite the TLOA’s specific provisions, it is not to be interpreted as limiting a U.S. Attorney from ultimately determining the
liaison’s duties necessary to serve a particular Indian community.178 Further, to enhance the prosecution of minor crimes, U.S. Attorneys’ offices
are encouraged to appoint Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys to prosecute
crime in Indian Country where crime rates exceed the national average or
where the rate of declined prosecutions exceeds the average rate.179 The
TLOA encourages federal prosecutors to coordinate with federal courts
to hold trials or other criminal proceedings in Indian Country.180 Ultimately, the creation of Special Assistant Attorneys is left to the discretion
of the individual office.181
The TLOA also expands and clarifies the authority of BIA officers
to arrest suspected offenders for crimes committed on reservations.182
Prior to TLOA passage, BIA officers could arrest without a warrant if the
offense was committed in their presence or, in the case of a felony, if the
BIA officer “ha[d] reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed, or [wa]s committing, the felony.”183 In the case of
a misdemeanor involving domestic or dating violence, stalking, or violation of a protection order, an arrest could be made if an element of the
offense included the use of force or threatened use of a deadly weapon,
and if the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person arrested

176. See sec. 213, § 13(d)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 2269.
177. See sec. 213, § 13(b)(6) 124 Stat. at 2269. They will also provide seminars to
train tribal officers as special law enforcement commissions, under which tribal officers will act under the direction of federal law enforcement officers. § 231, 124 Stat.
at 2273–74.
178. Sec. 213, § 13(c), 124 Stat. at 2269 (“Nothing in this section limits the authority of any United States Attorney to determine the duties of a tribal liaison officer to
meet the needs of the Indian tribes located within the relevant Federal district.”).
179. Sec. 213, § 13(d)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 2269.
180. Sec. 213, § 13(d)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 2269.
181. See sec. 213, § 13(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 2269.
182. See 155 CONG. REC. S4333–34 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Byron Dorgan). In Public Law 280 states, the authority to arrest depends on the jurisdiction. See JURISDICTION, supra note 111, at 4. Some states, such as Arizona, permit
tribal officers to make arrests on tribal lands if the officer has completed State Police
Academy. Other states, such as California, do not even recognize tribal officers. Id. at
96 n.60.
183. 25 U.S.C. § 2803(3) (2006).
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had, or was committing, the offense.184 For their part, tribal law enforcement complained that they lacked the authority to arrest non-Indians
who committed crimes on reservation land.185 As one tribal officer explained, this meant that if two men—one non-Indian and one Indian—
committed the same offense in his presence, he could arrest one, but not
the other.186 Instead, his only recourse was to retain the offender187 and
refer the crime committed by the non-Indian to federal prosecutors, who
rarely acted on referrals from tribal law enforcement.188
Under the TLOA, BIA officers will now have the authority to make
a warrantless arrest if the crime is committed in their presence or if the
offense is a federal crime and they “ha[ve] probable cause to believe the
individual to be arrested has committed, or is committing, the crime.”189
Further, the TLOA enhances the Special Law Enforcement Commission
program, which permits deputization of tribal officers to enforce federal
laws.190 The Secretary of the Interior is instructed to draft procedures for
the development of cooperative agreement memoranda under which tribal officers would aid the enforcement of federal law on Indian reservations.191 Further, the Secretary is required to draft—in consultation with
tribal officials—criteria tribal officers must meet to qualify for inclusion

184. Id.
185. See Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 895–96 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), superseded in part by statute, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (2006), as stated in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004)), and concluding that “tribe accordingly is authorized to stop and arrest Indian violators of tribal
law traveling on the highway . . . [but] tribal officers have no inherent power to arrest and book non-Indian violators” without some form of state authorization). Tribal
police may only stop non-Indians to ascertain their Indian status. See id. at 895–96
(“In order to permit tribal officers to exercise their legitimate tribal authority, therefore, it has been held not to violate a non-Indian’s rights when tribal officers stop him
or her long enough to ascertain that he or she is, in fact, not an Indian.”); Legal
Hurdles, supra note 23.
186. Legal Hurdles, supra note 23.
187. See Bressi, 575 F.3d at 896 (“If the violator turns out to be a non-Indian, the
tribal officer may detain the violator and deliver him or her to state or federal authorities.”); Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding
that tribal police may only detain non-Indian violators in order to deliver them to
state or federal authorities when acting under tribal authority to exclude nonmembers
from reservation).
188. Legal Hurdles, supra note 23; see also JURISDICTION, supra note 111, at 4
n.10.
189. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, sec. 211(c),
§ 4(3)(D)(ii), 124 Stat. 2258, 2266–67.
190. § 231, 124 Stat. at 2272–74.
191. Id.
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in the Special Law Enforcement Commissions.192 It is unclear, however, if
the TLOA extends the authority of tribal police to arrest or detain nonIndians as the act specifies that “[n]othing in this Act confers on an Indian tribe criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.”193
Addressing the epidemic of domestic violence and sexual assault in
Indian Country specifically, the TLOA seeks to enhance training and coordination to aid the investigation and prosecution of crimes of sexual
violence.194 For instance, federal officials are required to notify tribal governments when a sex offender is released onto a reservation from federal
custody.195 Additionally, federal health and law enforcement agencies
must develop consistent sexual assault protocols and appear to testify in
tribal court prosecutions of sexual assailants.196 Further, federal law enforcement officers are required to undergo specialized training in conducting interviews of sexual assault victims and in the collection and
preservation of evidence in sexual assault cases.197 According to Senator
Dorgan, these provisions are designed to improve both federal and tribal
prosecutions of sexual assault.198
B. Coordinating Federal and Tribal Law Enforcement
The TLOA also seeks to strengthen tribal law enforcement through
increased federal participation in tribal prosecutions, enhanced penalties
available to tribal courts, and improved resources. Specifically, in the
event federal law enforcement officers decline or terminate a criminal
investigation, they are required to “coordinate with the appropriate tribal
law enforcement officials regarding the status of the investigation and the
use of evidence relevant to the case in a tribal court with authority over
the crime alleged.”199 Further, FBI officials must compile annual reports
detailing each investigation declined or terminated and provide annual
reports to Congress.200 The disposition reports must detail the type of

192. Id.
193. § 206, 124 Stat. at 2264.
194. 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron
Dorgan).
195. § 261, 124 Stat. at 2299.
196. § 263, 124 Stat. at 2300; accord S. 797, 111th Cong. (as introduced Apr. 2,
2009); 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron
Dorgan).
197. § 262, 124 Stat. at 229; accord 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009)
(statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
198. 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron
Dorgan).
199. Sec. 212, § 10(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2267.
200. Sec. 212, § 10(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 2267.
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crime, whether the perpetrator or victim is Indian or non-Indian, and the
reason the investigation was declined or terminated.201 Similarly, the
TLOA mandates that federal prosecutors coordinate with tribal prosecutors regarding any case over which the tribe has concurrent jurisdiction in
advance of the expiration of the tribal statute of limitations.202 If the U.S.
Attorneys’ Office declines to prosecute, it must coordinate with “tribal
justice officials regarding the status of the investigation and the use of
evidence relevant to the case in a tribal court with authority over the
crime alleged.”203 Federal prosecutors must also report to the Native
American Issues Coordinator every case declined for prosecution, including the type of crime, whether the victim or the accused is Indian or nonIndian, and the reason for declining to investigate or prosecute the offense.204 The Issues Coordinator must then submit annual declination reports to Congress.205
Combined with increasing the possibility of tribal prosecutions, the
TLOA also seeks to strengthen tribal justice systems. Specifically, the
TLOA increases tribal courts’ authority to punish offenders with from
one-year to three-years imprisonment.206 In conjunction with this provision, tribal courts are required to provide defense counsel to indigent defendants.207 The TLOA also expands the authority of tribal police officers
to arrest suspected offenders for crimes committed on reservations.208
To further assist tribal law enforcement, the TLOA contains specific
provisions for increased investment in existing federal programs designed
to assist tribal governments in investigating, prosecuting, and incarcerat-

201. Id. This requirement is necessitated by the Justice Department’s refusal to
release data on the rates at which it declines to prosecute reservation crime. See
Jalonick, supra note 165.
202. Sec. 213, § 13(b)(5), 124 Stat. at 2269; see also 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily
ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
203. Sec. 212, § 2809(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 2267.
204. Id. at 2267–68. The newly created Native American Issues Coordinator will
work within the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys of the Justice Department.
Sec. 214, § 2811, 124 Stat. at 2271. This position is charged with coordinating all U.S.
Attorneys responsible for prosecution of Indian Country crimes, as well as with
“coordinat[ing the] prosecutions of crimes of national significance in Indian country,
as determined by the Attorney General,” and with serving as a liaison with other
sections of the Justice Department and the Attorney General’s Office. Id.
205. Id.
206. § 234, 124 Stat. at 2279–82; accord 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2,
2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
207. § 234, 124 Stat. at 2279–82; accord 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2,
2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
208. 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron
Dorgan).
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ing offenders by improving courts, jails, youth programs, and policing efforts in Indian Country.209 Tribes are permitted to enter into agreements
with the Bureau of Prisons to transfer offenders convicted in tribal courts
to the federal facilities.210 Further, the TLOA sets aside $35 million for
each year from 2010 to 2014 to provide grants to tribes to improve or
build jails, to construct regional detention centers for long-term incarceration, to develop alternatives to incarceration, and to build tribal justice
centers that would combine tribal police, courts, and corrections services
to handle violations of tribal laws.211 Under the Justice Department’s
Community Oriented Policing Services program, tribes could receive
long-term or permanent grants to hire and train tribal police officers and
for law enforcement equipment, weapons, and vehicles.212
Finally, the TLOA seeks to enhance reservation law enforcement in
those circumstances where state jurisdiction applies, but where states lack
either the resources or will to investigate or prosecute reservation crime.
In such cases, a tribe could request federal support in the criminal investigation and prosecution.213 Once the Attorney General consents to provide this support, the tribe’s request will essentially grant concurrent
jurisdiction to the United States.214 Further, state and tribal governments
are encouraged to “enter into cooperative law enforcement agreements
[to] . . . combat crime in Indian country and nearby communities.”215
Clearly, the TLOA is a step in the right direction. As Senator Dorgan acknowledges, the TLOA constitutes “initial steps to mend this broken system by arming tribal justice officials with the needed tools to
protect their communities.”216 It does not, however, go far enough in providing tribal governments with the legal tools necessary to protect their
communities from sexual predators.217

209. Id.
210. § 234, 124 Stat. at 2279–82.
211. § 244, 124 Stat. at. 2294.
212. Id.
213. § 221(b), 124 Stat. at 2272.
214. Id.
215. § 222(3), 124 Stat. at 2272.
216. 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron
Dorgan); see also Handler, supra note 33, at 263.
217. See Paul Schmelzer, Bachmann Votes Against Act to Help Native American
Police Combat Rape “Epidemic,” MN. INDEPENDENT (July 28, 2010), http://minnesota
independent.com/61865/bachmann-votes-against-bill-to-help-native-american-policecombat-rape-epidemic (discussing tribal leaders’ dissatisfaction with TLOA).
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III. HOW THE TLOA LEAVES THE JURISDICTIONAL KNOTS
INTACTS AND INDIAN WOMEN AT RISK
Despite its well-meaning attempt to address the troubling epidemic
of reservation crime, the TLOA does not go far enough to repair the
fundamental problem that hinders effective law enforcement and that
permits sexual assaults to flourish on reservations. Ultimately, the TLOA
perpetuates a broken jurisdictional scheme by continuing to vest law enforcement responsibility in the hands of remote federal officials who have
proven unlikely to investigate criminal complaints, to arrest suspects, or
to prosecute offenders. A better approach would ensure local control of
law enforcement so that those investigating and prosecuting crimes both
better understand and are more accountable to crime victims and their
communities.218
A. Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Problem with the TLOA’s
Perpetuation of Federal Jurisdiction
Off the record, federal law-enforcement officials admit that U.S. Attorneys view prosecution of reservation crime as a waste of prosecution
resources.219 Many simply find sexual assault cases insignificant compared
to their usual cases involving terrorism, organized crime, drug offenses,
and racketeering.220 According to former U.S. Attorney Margaret Chiara,
federal attorneys often balk at taking sexual assault cases, complaining
that they “did not sign up for this,” but instead had planned to handle
white-collar crime, conspiracy, and drug cases.221 Unfortunately, some
federal judges echo these feelings, with some complaining that they
would have “stayed in state court” if they had wanted to handle such
cases.222

218. Eid, supra note 20, at 44 (noting that proponents of tribal jurisdiction have
argued that “the net effect of Oliphant was to discourage or even prevent tribes from
taking greater responsibility for their own public safety”); see also SEN. DANIEL INOUYE, MAKING PERMANENT THE LEGISLATIVE REINSTATEMENT, FOLLOWING THE
DECISION OF DURO AGAINST REINA (58 U.S.L.W. 4643, MAY 29, 1990) OF THE
POWER OF INDIAN TRIBES TO EXERCISE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIANS, S.
REP. NO. 102-168, at 7 (1991); Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of Eighteen American
Indian Tribes at 16, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (No. 03-107) (noting
that federal prosecutors lack incentives to deal with reservation crime); Schmelzer,
supra note 217 (noting that crime is viewed as local issue best resolved by local
authorities).
219. Principles, Politics, supra note 36.
220. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 13.
221. Justice Broken, supra note 13; Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 13.
222. Justice Broken, supra note 13.
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But it is just these sorts of “pedestrian” offenses—aggravated assault, domestic violence, and sexual assault—that make reservations
“places of unrelenting, low-level violence” and that “wear[ ] down” the
lives of residents.223 Nevertheless, the persistent perception that crime on
Indian reservations is not a priority for the Justice Department seems to
have taken hold.224 Rather than being viewed as an essential service to a
crime-ridden community, prosecution of reservation crime is dismissed as
serving too small of a population and taking scarce federal resources
away from more pressing national priorities such as terrorism and immigration.225 This perception is borne out by statistics showing that U.S. Attorneys’ offices refuse more cases from the BIA than from almost any
other federal agency.226 Indeed, federal prosecutors decline to prosecute
more than twice as many reservation crimes as they do non-reservation
crimes over which they also have jurisdiction.227
Far from being an isolated problem, the low priority given to policing Indian Country is reinforced by Justice Department policies.228 For
instance, according to one federal attorney, prosecution of Indian Country crime is not part of the criteria used to evaluate individual attorneys.229
Instead, it is the cases involving terrorism, organized crime, major-drug
cases, and white-collar crimes that are used to measure performance.230
Thus, it is no wonder that some federal attorneys consider prosecution of
223. Principles, Politics, supra note 36 (quoting current federal prosecutor who
declined to be named).
224. See id.
225. Jalonick, supra note 165; Principles, Politics, supra note 36.
226. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003, at 33 (2003) (table details that cases from the
BIA are declined at a rate of 58.8 percent).
227. Justice Broken, supra note 13 (The author created the statistics based on
data from “the Interior Department and the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, or TRAC, at Syracuse University.”).
228. Equally worrisome is the apparent lack of knowledge of the federal role in
prosecuting reservation crime. One former U.S. Attorney described a conversation
with a high-ranking Justice Department official who asked him to explain why he was
involved in prosecuting a double murder on the Navajo Reservation. Principles, Politics, supra note 36. The official seemed entirely unaware of the Justice Department’s
role as the sole prosecutor of major crimes on Indian reservations. Id.
229. Principles, Politics, supra note 36 (quoting a current federal prosecutor who
declined to be named that “[o]ne criterion that has never been on the list is Indian
Country cases”).
230. Id.; see also Joe Hanel, Justice Department to Help Tribes, DURANGO HERALD, Sept. 22, 2009 (explaining that the Justice Department may begin including handling of Indian cases part of assessment of federal attorney’s job performance in effort
“to change the culture of the Justice Department when it comes to Native American
issues” so that Indian cases stay priority regardless of presidential administration).
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crimes such as sexual assault on reservations as “career killers” and opt to
pursue more professionally valuable cases.231 While the TLOA provides
that evaluations of tribal liaisons will include performance of their obligations to Indian reservations, that provision does not necessarily apply to
those federal prosecutors who are not designated as tribal liaisons.232
Furthermore, vesting jurisdiction in remote federal prosecutors
raises myriad unnecessary challenges to law enforcement. Many reservations are remote, isolated communities far from urban centers where FBI
and U.S. Attorneys’ offices are likely to be located.233 The remoteness and
231. Principles, Politics, supra note 36. Federal prosecutors who nonetheless persist in pressing for increased efforts to curtail reservation crime are met with resistance from Justice Department officials. Id. For instance, when one prosecutor
attempted to have the FBI record interviews with child sexual assault victims he was
ordered to “back down” by Department officials. Id. Even more telling was how a
drive to improve prosecution of reservation crime led to the termination of five U.S.
Attorneys. Brought to light in the 2007 scandal involving the termination of eight
Justice Department lawyers by the Bush administration was the firing of five attorneys who had been pressing the Justice Department to more aggressively pursue prosecutions of crime in Indian Country. Id. In her congressional testimony, former White
House liaison Monica Goodling confirmed that one of those attorneys had been terminated because “he spent an extraordinary amount of time” on American Indian
issues. Continuing Investigation into the U.S. Attorneys Controversy and Related Matters (Part I) Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 95 (2007). In a breathtakingly ironic twist, this attorney—fired for spending too much time on Indian
issues—was the chair of the U.S. Attorneys’ Native American Issues Subcommittee,
“essentially the department’s point man on improving the effectiveness of reservation
prosecutions.” Principles, Politics, supra note 36. These attorneys’ terminations only
confirmed the beliefs of tribal leaders that law enforcement on Indian reservations
was a low priority for the Department, that it would avoid spending scarce resources
on such law enforcement, that federal prosecutors were often ignorant of—if not
downright hostile to—their responsibilities, and that any effort to change the status
quo would be met with resistance and termination. Id. This is not to suggest that
reservation crime was taken any more seriously under Democratic administrations.
Rather, reservation crime does not appear to have been a priority to any administration. Id. Indeed, federal prosecutors have declined to prosecute nearly two-thirds of
the felony cases from Indian Country for more than a decade. Id. Ultimately, many
Indians see the failure to investigate and prosecute reservation crime as just another
failure of the federal government to live up to its obligations to the tribes. Id.; see also
155 CONG. REC. S4333 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan)
(“The United States created this system. In so doing, our Government accepted the
responsibility to police Indian lands, and incurred a legal obligation to provide for the
public safety of tribal communities. Unfortunately, we are not meeting that
obligation.”).
232. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211,
§ 213(b)(2)(B)(ii), 124 Stat. 2258, 2270 (2010).
233. SEN. DANIEL INOUYE, MAKING PERMANENT THE LEGISLATIVE REINSTATEMENT, FOLLOWING THE DECISION OF DURO AGAINST REINA (58 U.S.L.W. 4643, MAY
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sheer size of most reservations can make investigation and prosecution
difficult.234 First, the closest federal court may be hundreds of miles away
from the crime scene.235 When a reservation is hours away from the courthouse where the trial will take place, federal prosecutors must transport
witnesses, investigators, and the victim to the courthouse and house them
during the duration of the trial.236 Doing so can increase the costs of a trial
by thousands of dollars, make witnesses less willing to cooperate, and
further burden victims.237 The TLOA does encourage federal prosecutors
to coordinate with district courts to hold trials in Indian Country, but this
is a goal, not a requirement.238 While holding hearings and trials in Indian
Country may ease the burden on victims and witnesses, it does little to
hold down the costs or logistical burdens associated with transporting
prosecutors, district court judges, and personnel from remote offices to
reservations.
Second, this geographical remoteness makes it easy for federal
agents to ignore the problem of reservation crime. As Senator Byron
Dorgan explained, “some offices have taken an out-of-sight, out-of-mind
attitude with regard to our obligation in Indian Country.”239 The perception that distance can impede prosecution is borne out by a General Accounting Office study that found that the further away a reservation was

29, 1990) OF THE POWER OF INDIAN TRIBES TO EXERCISE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
OVER INDIANS, S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 7 (1991) (“Most Indian reservations are located far from urban centers, they are geographically isolated and remote, they are
separated from state law enforcement centers by significant distances.”); Principles,
Politics, supra note 36; Gary Fields, Tattered Justice: On U.S. Indian Reservations,
Criminals Slip Through Gaps, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007, at A1 (cited in Rebecca A.
Hart & M. Alexander Lowther, Honoring Sovereignty: Aiding Tribal Efforts to Protect Native American Women from Domestic Violence, 96 CAL. L. REV. 185, 214
(2008)); see also Pacheco, supra note 18, at 30.
234. Richmond, supra note 32; Principles, Politics, supra note 36; see also S. REP.
NO. 102-168, at 7 (“The only practical means of providing an immediate law enforcement response to situations arising on the reservation has consistently been found to
be that of tribal or local BIA police, with arraignment in tribal court, and confinement
in tribal detention facilities.”).
235. Principles, Politics, supra note 36; see also S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 7.
236. Principles, Politics, supra note 36; see also Pacheco, supra note 18, at 29–30;
S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 7.
237. Principles, Politics, supra note 36.
238. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, sec. 213,
§ 13(d)(1)(C), 124 Stat. 2258, 2269 (2010).
239. Jalonick, supra note 165.
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from an FBI field office, the more likely the U.S. Attorneys’ Office would
decline the case.240
In addition to geographic challenges, federal law enforcement
agents also face social and cultural barriers in policing distinct communities whose traditions and cultures they may know little about. There are
more than 560 federally recognized tribes,241 each with varying traditions,
cultures, social structures, and histories unfamiliar to federal officials.242
Unfamiliarity with tribal cultural norms can adversely affect criminal investigation and prosecution even in those locations where tribal lands are
not remote. Given the history of conflict between native and nonnative
cultures, it may simply be difficult for Anglo officers to infiltrate tribes
for investigation or undercover work.243 Further, tribal members are apt
to distrust federal law enforcement officials as a consequence of what one
former federal attorney described as the “cultural memory of the violence and abuse that came with colonization of the West.”244 Put more
plainly by the head of Justice and Regulatory Affairs of the Southern Ute
Tribe, “you’ve taken our land; you’ve taken our water. How can we trust
that you’ll take this case and take these people dear to our hearts and
really take care of them?”245 Because federal officers are considered untrustworthy outsiders, residents may not be forthcoming in their statements, limiting the ability of federal officers to pursue an investigation.246
240. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION ON MAJOR CRIMES ON
THREE MONTANA RESERVATIONS 25, 28–31 (1989).
241. See Kathleen A. Ward, Before and After the White Man: Indian Women,
Property, Progress, and Power, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 245, 254 (2007); National Tribal
Justice Resource Center, Tribal Court History, http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
tribalcourts/history.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
242. See SEN. DANIEL INOUYE , P.L. 102-137, MAKING PERMANENT THE LEGISLATIVE REINSTATEMENT, FOLLOWING THE DECISION OF DURO AGAINST REINA (58
U.S.L.W. 4643, MAY 29, 1990) OF THE POWER OF INDIAN TRIBES TO EXERCISE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIANS, S. REP. NO. 102-168 at 7 (1991); Brief of Amici
Curiae on Behalf of Eighteen American Indian Tribes, supra note 218, at 16 (suggesting that tribal law enforcement is in better place to police reservations because of
its familiarity with tribal customs); Roberts, supra note 31, at 549.
243. Richmond, supra note 32.
244. Principles, Politics, supra note 36.
245. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
246. Justice Broken, supra note 13. Of course this distrust runs both ways, and
tribal law enforcement is not without fault. Id. For their part, tribes may hesitate to
refer offenders to federal or state law enforcement out of fear that their reservations
will be considered unsafe or that they will be viewed as ceding their sovereignty. Richmond, supra note 32. For instance, in the 1990s, tribes resisted efforts to increase the
number of federal agents assigned to police Indian Country out of fear of increased in
federal power. Justice Broken, supra note 13. Similarly, efforts to shift more policing
responsibility to the tribes have not always been met with enthusiasm by tribal gov-
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Tribal police from within the community are often in a better position to
conduct investigations and convince victims and witnesses to come forward, and thus to more effectively police reservations.
The low priority given to policing and prosecuting reservation crime
is reflected in the high crime rates in Indian Country and the overwhelming failure of federal officials to investigate or prosecute those offenses.
In interviews, U.S. Attorneys contend that they pursue all reported
crimes,247 but Justice Department statistics suggest otherwise. Even while
crime on reservations has increased substantially in the last decade, investigations of crime on Indian reservations has actually declined by as much
as 20 percent.248 Indeed, the likelihood of an arrest being made following
a rape report differs dramatically between Indian Country and the rest of
the United States. Of reported rapes nationwide in 2006, 26 percent led
to an arrest,249 but of those rapes reported from Indian Country in 2006,
only 7 percent led to an arrest.250 In the tiny percentage of cases where an
arrest is made, it is unlikely the accused will ever face criminal prosecution. Rather, federal prosecutors decline to prosecute three-quarters of
adult rapes referred to them by tribal governments.251 Consequently, the

ernments, which hesitate to incur the costs or to professionalize their police forces.
Richmond, supra note 32.
247. Legal Hurdles, supra note 23.
248. According to the Justice Department, investigations of crime on Indian reservations declined by 21 percent between 1997 and 2000. PERRY, supra note 31, at 19.
249. See FBI, 2006 CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://www2
.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/offenses/violent_crime/forcible_rape.html. In 2006, there were
an estimated 92,455 forcible rapes reported to law enforcement nationwide. Id. Of
those, there were 24,535 arrests. FBI, 2006 CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: TABLE 29
(2007), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_29.html.
250. Michael Riley, Lawless Lands: Justice: Inaction’s Fatal Price, DENV. POST,
Nov. 12, 2007, at A1. For aggravated assault, only 4 percent of perpetrators were
arrested. Id. For lesser crimes, the numbers are even lower—only sixteen arrests were
made out of 4,565 reports of burglary. Id. This data does not come from the Justice
Department, which has refused to release data on the rates at which it declines to
prosecute reservation crime. Jalonick, supra note 165. Rather, the statistics were compiled by the Denver Post team who assisted Michael Riley in his Lawless Lands series.
See Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 13 (interview with Michael Riley). They received
data from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, or TRAC, at Syracuse
University and cross-referenced it with data from the FBI and the BIA. Id.
251. See Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 13 (“[Sixty-five percent] of the complaints that are filed are just rejected out of hand by federal prosecutors. That’s an
astounding number.”) (reviewing the data compiled by the Denver Post); see also 155
CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan describing declines between 2004 and 2007). In cases of child sexual offenses, federal prosecutors decline 72 percent of cases. Id. For Native Alaskan women the rate of
prosecution is even lower: in “approximately 90 percent of cases where women un-
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vast majority of sexual assaults occurring on Indian reservations go unpunished, victims are left without any law enforcement protection, and
reservations become safe havens for sexual predators to attack their victims with little fear of punishment.252
It is difficult to imagine that such dismal rates of arrest and prosecution would be tolerated in any other community in the United States.253 In
those communities, however, citizens can demand more from their law
enforcement officials, appeal to their elected leaders for change, or vote
to change recalcitrant leaders.254 In Indian Country, this principle of local
policing has been turned on its head, with devastating consequences for
Indian tribes in general and Indian women in particular. Instead of a police force that dwells within the community it polices, jurisdiction is
vested in officers hundreds of miles away, who are not only geographically, but also politically remote from the communities they are charged
with protecting.255 Thus, appeals to elected officials and local law enforcement are of little use when the community’s law enforcement is controlled by outsiders largely unaccountable to tribal citizens.
The TLOA attempts to increase federal accountability by imposing
stricter reporting requirements. Under the TLOA, the FBI must compile
data on all decisions to not refer a case to federal prosecutors and report

dergo forensic exams[,] there is no prosecution.” EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note
35, at 6. Indeed, rates at which prosecutors decline to prosecute vary depending on
district. See Justice Broken, supra note 13 (chart detailing varying rates of declinations
in different districts).
252. See Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 13; Handler, supra note 33, at 263 (“As a
result of this broken system of justice, the prevalence of violent crime within Indian
communities is formidable.”).
253. See Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 13 (“What would we do if the district
attorney for Denver, if we learned that he was declining 65% of cases? Well, it would
be an outrage, it would be enough to send the citizenry into the streets.”); see e.g.,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TESTING JUSTICE: THE RAPE KIT BACKLOG IN LOS ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/rapekit_0309web.pdf (describing Los Angeles’s increase in 2007 arrest rate of
28 percent as reversal of “worrisome trend” from 2006 where rate was 26 percent).
254. Schmelzer, supra note 217 (“The reason that crime is a local issue in the
United States is that then you can hold local people accountable.”) (internal quotations omitted).
255. SEN. DANIEL INOUYE, P.L. 102-137, MAKING PERMANENT THE LEGISLATIVE
REINSTATEMENT, FOLLOWING THE DECISION OF DURO AGAINST REINA (58 U.S.L.W.
4643, MAY 29, 1990) OF THE POWER OF INDIAN TRIBES TO EXERCISE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIANS, S. Rep. 102-168, at 7 (1991); Brief of Amici Curiae on
Behalf of Eighteen American Indian Tribes, supra note 218, at 16 (noting that federal
prosecutors lack incentives to deal with reservation crime).
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this information to Congress on an annual basis.256 Similarly, federal prosecutors must compile information on all cases that they declined to prosecute.257 Cases declined for prosecution must be reported to the Native
American Issues Coordinator, who is tasked with annually report declinations to Congress.258 Through this reporting mechanism, the TLOA seeks
to create an incentive for federal officials—who are far removed from
Indian reservations, who must balance competing priorities, and who may
lack any affinity for tribal populations—to nevertheless police those
communities.259
Such an incentive however, is no substitute for the increased legitimacy and sense of accountability that occur when a community is policed
by members from within that community.260 Simply put, requiring annual
reports be sent to a remote Congress is a poor proxy for direct responsibility to a voting constituency.

256. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, sec. 212,
§ 10(a)(2), 124 Stat. 2258, 2267–68; see also 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2,
2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
257. See sec. 212, § 10(a)(3), (b), 124 Stat. at 2267–68; see also 155 CONG. REC.
S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
258. See sec. 212, § 10(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 2267; see also 155 CONG. REC. S4334
(daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
259. See All Things Considered: Bill Bolsters Tribal Powers to Prosecute Rape
Cases (NPR radio broadcast July 23, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
transcript/transcript.php?storyId=92833011 [hereinafter Bill Bolsters Tribal Power];
see also Roberts, supra note 31, at 548–49 (noting that tribal leaders argue that “the
federal government does not have as big an incentive to prosecute these types of cases
as do the tribes due to a lack of knowledge of the culture and community, and an
overburdened docket”).
260. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 (1978), superseded by statute,
25 U.S. C. § 1301(2), as recognized by United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004)
(“[Tribes] have a significant interest in maintaining orderly relations among their
members and in preserving tribal customs and traditions, apart from the federal interest in law and order on the reservation.”); S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 7 (“The only practical means of providing an immediate law enforcement response to situations arising
on the reservation has consistently been found to be that of tribal or local BIA police,
with arraignment in tribal court, and confinement in tribal detention facilities.”); Brief
of Amici Curiae on Behalf of Eighteen American Indian Tribes, supra note 218, at 16
(“Tribes have the incentive and are the logical jurisdictional authority to deal with
misdemeanor crime.”); Roberts, supra note 31, at 548–49 (noting that tribal leaders
“argue that tribes have greater incentive to police their territory than the federal government does because “they know the territory and the people, and their presence
fosters deterrence and a sense of community pride and responsibility.”); see also Sarah E. Waldeck, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253,
1254–55 (2000) (describing the benefit of community policing).
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Nor is the TLOA’s creation of tribal liaisons likely to compensate
for a distant law enforcement unaccountable to the local constituency.
Under the TLOA, a primary duty of tribal liaisons is facilitating communication between tribal residents and federal law enforcement.261 But at
one end of such communications are federal officials who ultimately remain far removed from reservation life and thus, from the consequence
of their law enforcement decisions. Moreover, while the liaisons’ duties
are seemingly set by the TLOA, each liaison’s actual duties are ultimately
left to the discretion of each individual U.S. Attorneys’ Office.262 With
chronic underfunding for tribal law enforcement and competing law enforcement priorities faced by each U.S. Attorneys’ Office, it is difficult to
discern what this discretion will mean in the long run for reservation law
enforcement.
Further, declination reports and tribal liaisons cannot overcome the
physical distance between federal law enforcement and Indian reservations that may impede the collection of evidence. The TLOA seeks to
close this distance by providing for Special Law Enforcement Commissions for tribal police officers. Under that provision, tribal officers may be
deputized to enforce federal laws on tribal lands, possibly including the
right to arrest non-Indians and to conduct investigations.263 However,
before they can be certified, tribal officers would have to satisfy Interior
Department criteria for certification.264 At this point, it is unclear what
those criteria will be or how many tribal officers will meet them.265 Once
certified, tribal police will be acting under color of federal authority and
not pursuant to tribal sovereignty. It is uncertain, however, whether they
will be authorized to conduct independent investigations or will be limited to those investigations authorized by federal law enforcement officials. If the latter, then tribal police will continue to be hobbled by the
lower priority traditionally given to federal policing of Indian
reservations.

261. See sec. 213, § 13(b), 124 Stat. at 2268–69.
262. See sec. 213, § 13(c), 124 Stat. at 2269 (“Nothing in this section limits the
authority of any United States Attorney to determine the duties of a tribal liaison
officer to meet the needs of the Indian tribes located within the relevant Federal
district.”).
263. § 231, 124 Stat. at 2272–74; see 25 U.S.C. § 2803 (2006).
264. See § 231, 124 Stat. at 2272–74.
265. Under the TLOA, the Secretary of the Interior has 180 days to establish
procedures to enter into memoranda of agreement for the use (with or without reimbursement) of the personnel or facilities of a federal, tribal, state, or other government agency to aid in the enforcement or carrying out in Indian Country of a law of
either the United States or an Indian tribe that has authorized the Secretary to enforce tribal laws. § 231, 124 Stat. at 2272–74.
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B. Half-Measures: Why the TLOA Ultimately Fails to Improve Tribal
Policing
The lower priority given to tribal law enforcement has resulted in
inadequate policing resources on each reservation. Despite its trust responsibility to provide Indian tribes with federal law enforcement,266 the
United States provides significantly fewer law enforcement resources to
native communities than are available in comparable nonnative rural
communities.267 According to testimony about a 2006 BIA gap analysis,
“tribal police were staffed at [58] percent of need.”268 Consequently,
fewer than three thousand federal and tribal law enforcement officers are
responsible for policing fifty-six million acres of Indian Country.269 This

266. § 202 (a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2262 (“[T]he United States has distinct legal, treaty,
and trust obligations to provide for the public safety of Indian Country.”); 154 CONG.
REC. H8456 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2008) (statement of Rep. Herseth Sandlin) (“Law
enforcement is one of the Federal Government’s trust obligations to tribes.”); 155
CONG. REC. S4333 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan) (“[O]ur
Government accepted responsibility to police Indian lands, and . . . to provide for
the public safety of tribal communities.”).
267. SOVEREIGN TRIBAL AUTHORITY, supra note 22, at 3. The BIA employs 334
officers in Indian Country. BRIAN A. REAVES & LUNN M. BAUER, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETINS, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS, 2002, at 4 (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo
02.pdf. Nationally, there are thirty-two federal officers for every 1,000 persons. Id. at
1. By way of comparison, Amtrak is policed by 327 federal officers; the U.S. Mint by
375. Id. at 4. The Standing Rock Reservation that Leslie Ironroad called home covers
2.3 million acres, nearly twice the size of the state of Delaware, and includes four
towns, eight communities, 2,500 miles of road, and 10,000 residents. Letter from Amnesty Int’l to Members of the U.S. Congress, (Dec. 5, 2009), available at http://
www.amnestyusa.org/pdf/Cox_approps2008.pdf [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l Letter].
Nevertheless, the Reservation has only seven tribal officers and ten BIA officers to
provide all the necessary law enforcement services for the entire Reservation. Rapes
High for Indigenous Women, supra note 35; Amnesty Int’l Letter, supra. Consequently, the Reservation typically has only two officers—and often only one—on duty
at any given time. MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 13, at 43.
268. Oversight Hearing to Examine Bureau of Indian Affairs and Tribal Police
Recruitment, Training, Hiring and Retention Before S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th
Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Myra Pearson, Chairwoman, Spirit Lake Tribe). Adequate staffing would require hiring 1,854 additional police officers. Id.
269. § 202(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 2262; accord 155 CONG. REC. S4333 (daily ed. Apr.
2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan); 154 CONG. REC. H8456 (daily ed. Sept.
18, 2008) (statement of Rep. Herseth Sandlin); Johnson, supra 31. For example, the
staffing levels at Standing Rock are 66 percent below the number of officers in a
comparable off-reservation rural area. Amnesty Int’l Letter, supra note 267.
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“reflects less than [half] of the law enforcement presence in comparable
rural communities.”270
With such inadequate resources it is no wonder that on many reservations it can take days or even months for an officer to respond to a
reported crime.271 During that time, evidentiary leads can run cold, evidence itself can be lost, and victims can become discouraged and less
likely to participate in the investigation.272 Even before a decision to prosecute can be made, jurisdictional confusion can render that decision
moot. Because jurisdiction depends on whether the victim or offender is
Indian and precisely where the offense occurred—and because there may
be concurrent jurisdiction—it is often difficult to determine who has law
enforcement authority in a particular case.273 As a result of this confusion,
investigation leads can run cold or end up never being pursued.274 In the
case of sexual assault, the collection of evidence from the victim can be
delayed to the point where it is no longer available while law enforcement officials attempt to sort out who has proper jurisdiction.275
270. § 202(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 2262; accord 155 CONG. REC. S4333 (daily ed. Apr.
2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
271. Rape Cases Go Uninvestigated, supra note 1; see also 155 CONG. REC. S4333
(daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan) (“The lack of police presence has resulted in significant delays in responding to victims’ calls for assistance.”).
Nor is Standing Rock’s inadequate staffing unique. For instance, the Lac du Flambeu
Reservation has nine full-time and four part-time officers to police 3,000 residents
living on 108 square miles. Richmond, supra note 32. Even more worrisome, at least
one-third of all Alaska Native villages that are not accessible by road have absolutely
no law enforcement presence at all. Tribal law enforcement resources vary wildly. For
example, one Oklahoma tribe has a police force consisting of fourteen to fifteen officers. MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 13, at 43. In contrast, other Oklahoma tribes
have only two or three officers on their force. Id. The Cheyenne River Reservation
has three officers per shift to police 15,000 residents living in nineteen separate communities spread out over an area the size of Connecticut. Oversight Field Hearing on
the Needs and Challenges of Tribal Law Enforcement on Indian Reservations Before
H. Comm. on Natural Res., 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Joseph Brings Plenty,
Chairman, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe). Although the Cheyenne River Reservation
is vast, that does not mean officers are not responding to crime reports. In 2006, officers on the Cheyenne River Reservation responded to 11,488 calls and made 11,791
arrests. Id. Nevertheless, it is typical for tribal police to respond in hours rather than
minutes to an emergency call. See, e.g., Gipp, supra 31.
272. See JURISDICTION, supra note 111, at 2.
273. Id., at 2; see also Pierce, supra note 57.
274. JURISDICTION, supra note 111, at 2.
275. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 35; see also Pierce, supra note 57. The
jurisdictional complexity can also discourage Indian women from wanting to report or
make it difficult for them to know which authority to approach. Legal Hurdles, supra
note 23; see also Pierce, supra note 57 (the jurisdictional issues “leav[e] Native American women confused”). In one case reported by Amnesty International, two women

R

R

R

R
R
R
R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX104.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 41

SEXUAL PREDATORS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS

7-NOV-11

14:04

279

While the TLOA seeks to bolster tribal police investigation and arrest ability,276 the problems of remoteness in space and culture also cannot be solved simply by having tribal police conduct investigations prior
to federal prosecution given the longstanding lack of cooperation and
mistrust often evident in relations between each camp. Federal prosecutors complain that tribal investigations are substandard, give federal law
enforcement an insufficient basis to continue the investigation, and that
prosecutors receive incomplete case files that cannot support a prosecution.277 In those cases where federal investigators have ceded investigative
responsibilities to the tribe,278 the federal perception of tribal police incompetence can mean the absence of any actual prosecution.279 Federal
prosecutors routinely decline such cases either because the victim has
been subjected to too many interviews or because the interviews were not
conducted by officers trained in interviewing child sexual assault victims.280 Because few tribal officers have such training, this means that virtually every child rape case investigated by tribal officers will not be
prosecuted.281 However, it is “rare” for the FBI to become involved in
investigating sexual assaults against Indian women.282 When the FBI does
become involved, its investigations are slow to start and, if an arrest is
made, it is often delayed weeks or months after the warrant has issued.283
were raped by three non-Indian men in 2005. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 35, at
2. However, because the women were blindfolded during the attack, prosecutors
doubted the women could identify whether the attacks occurred on federal, state, or
tribal lands. Id. This meant prosecution was unlikely because proper jurisdiction could
not be established. Id.
276. See supra Part II.B.
277. See Justice Broken, supra note 13; MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 13.
278. For instance, in cases involving child victims over the age of nine. Justice
Broken, supra note 13.
279. See Justice Broken, supra note 13. However, that a tribe has an assigned
police presence does not guarantee that reservation crimes will be taken more seriously. On the Navajo Reservation, for instance, the Tribe’s investigator works from
his home, which is located thirty minutes from the reservation. See Justice Broken,
supra note 13. Residents report that he and his staff will disappear from the reservation for months at a time. Id.
280. See Justice Broken, supra note 13.
281. See id.
282. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 35, at 4.
283. Id. Prosecutors contend that the use of alcohol by victims, suspects, and witnesses makes cases harder to prove. Justice Broken, supra note 13. Indeed, U.S. Attorneys routinely decline to prosecute cases where alcohol is involved. Principles,
Politics, supra note 36 (quoting current federal prosecutor who declined to be
named). U.S. Attorneys defend these decisions, explaining that they may only pursue
cases where there is sufficient probable cause and that they are “not in the business of
taking cases we’re going to lose.” Justice Broken, supra note 13. All too often, how-
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Finally, even when an investigation is conducted competently by tribal
officers, a handoff to federal prosecutors is of little effect when those
cases are unlikely to be prosecuted.284
Evidence passing in the other direction—from federal to tribal officials—may fare no better. While the TLOA requires that federal officials
coordinate with tribal law enforcement regarding the status of the case
and the use of evidence, it does not require that all evidence collected by
federal officials be submitted to Indian officials.285 Instead, the TLOA exempts the “transfer or disclos[ur]e [of] any confidential, privileged, or
statutorily protected communication, information, or source to an official
of any Indian tribe.”286 Consequently, tribal law enforcement may be required to cover old investigative ground in an effort to collect evidence
already in federal hands that was not turned over because of concerns of
confidentiality or privilege. The result is further delay in the tribe’s investigation and prosecution of reservation crime to the detriment of tribal
citizens.
The TLOA does contain several provisions that seek to ensure more
tribal prosecutions for those cases declined by federal prosecutors. For
instance, the TLOA requirement that federal investigators and prosecutors notify tribal governments when they decline to investigate or prosecute a sexual assault case would at least provide tribal law enforcement
an opportunity to investigate or prosecute the offense at the tribal level.287
Currently, tribal prosecutors report that they are rarely told that a case
has been declined, and that cases often languish for three to five years.288

ever, law enforcement officials simply assume alcohol was a factor, blaming Indian
women for attacks on the often mistaken belief that the victim was intoxicated as if
that excuses the offense. MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 13, at 47. For example, in
July 2006 an Alaska Native woman reported to the police that she had been raped by
a non-Native man. Id. at 1 “She gave a description of the alleged perpetrator and city
police officers told her that they were going to look for him.” Id. When the police did
not return, she went to the emergency room for treatment. Id. “[T]he woman had
bruises all over her body and was so traumatized that she was talking very quickly.”
Id. She was given some painkillers and money to go to a non-Native shelter, which
turned her away because they assumed that she was drunk. Id. A support worker
noted this case as an example of “why Native women don’t report. It’s creating a
breeding ground for sexual predators.” Id.
284. See Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 13; Principles, Politics, supra note 36.
285. An earlier version of TLOA required that federal law enforcement turn over
all evidence relevant to the investigation and prosecution of the alleged offense. See S.
797, 111th Cong., sec. 102, § 10(a)(1)(A), (2)(A) (as introduced in the Senate, Apr. 2,
2009).
286. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, sec. 212, § 10(c)(1), 124 Stat. 2258, 2268.
287. Sec. 212, § 10(a)(1), (3), 124 Stat. at 2267.
288. Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 13.
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Nor are victims likely to be kept informed of the status of the investigation or prosecution, including whether the suspect has been arrested.289
However, because it applies in only those cases where the tribe has
concurrent jurisdiction, this notification provision is of limited usefulness
in cases involving serious felonies such as rape and sexual assault. The
TLOA does not grant tribes jurisdiction over non-Indians in felony
cases.290 Thus, tribal courts could only prosecute those cases involving Indian perpetrators. But, more than 80 percent of sexual assaults are committed by non-Indians over whom the tribes have no jurisdiction
whatsoever.291 Because non-Indians account for all but 20 percent of the
sexual assaults on Indian reservations, requiring federal officials to refer
cases to tribal prosecutors is largely an empty gesture that does little to
address the real epidemic of sexual assault.292
Even for those cases delegated to the tribes that involve Indian defendants, tribal courts are still limited in their ability to meaningfully punish offenders by sentencing restrictions under ICRA.293 The TLOA
increases tribal courts’ authority to punish offenders, but only to a maximum thirty-six months imprisonment.294 The exceedingly weak penalties
available to tribal prosecutors to punish such serious offenses as rape and
sexual assault make such an option meaningless. Nationally, the average
sentence for rape is 136 months, while the average for other sexual assaults is ninety-two months.295 Thus, a sexual offender who commits his
crime in Indian Country would be subject to one-third to one-quarter the
penalty if he had committed the same offense outside Indian Country or

289. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 35, at 4.
290. See § 206, 124 Stat. at 2264.
291. Pacheco, supra note 18, at 2–4. Moreover, most crimes are not even reported
to federal officials. Justice Broken, supra note 13. Of nearly 6,000 aggravated assaults
reported in 2006, fewer than 10 percent were referred to federal prosecutors. Id. Of
those, less than half were prosecuted. Id. Specifically, “[o]f the nearly 5,900 aggravated assaults reported on reservations in fiscal year 2006, only 558 were referred to
federal prosecutors, who declined to prosecute 320 of them.” Id.
292. See SOVEREIGN TRIBAL AUTHORITY, supra note 22, at 1; see also PERRY,
supra note 31, at 22 (showing that 86 percent of perpetrators are non-Indian men).
293. See discussion supra accompanying notes 98–110 regarding question of
whether tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over Indian offenders in felonies under
the MCA.
294. Sec. 234(a)(2)(B), § 202(7)(C), 124 Stat. at 2279–82; accord 155 CONG. REC.
S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
295. Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 527 n.81 (2008) (citing MATTHEW R.
DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS 2000 4 (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fssc00.pdf).
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if he had been prosecuted by the state or federal government. It is difficult to imagine that this provision will do much to change a reservation
criminal justice scheme that “has been increasingly exploited by
criminals” precisely because enforcement is so weak.296 Tribal prosecutors
correctly complain that they cannot pursue felony charges regardless of
the conduct of the perpetrator.297 The TLOA does little to remedy this.298
Moreover, a scheme that divides jurisdiction or that places tribal police under the direction of federal law enforcement agencies is likely to
exacerbate any tendency toward law enforcement jurisdictional turf-fighting. On any Indian reservation, jurisdiction is already divvied between an
inordinate number of agencies. In addition to tribal law enforcement and
possible state jurisdiction, the various federal officers who may operate
within Indian Country include the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), BIA, as well as officers associated with other federal agencies.299 This type of jurisdictional overlap can create confusion that
296. § 202(a)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 2262.
297. Legal Hurdles, supra note 23; see also Pacheco, supra note 18, at 2–3 (explaining tribes lack of prosecutorial power).
298. Some tribes have prosecuted sexual assault offenders in tribal court, charging them with multiple charges and seeking consecutive one year sentences for each
offense. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 35, at 6. However, recent court cases have
suggested that tribal courts may not impose consecutive sentences that result in
longer than one year penalties. See Spears v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians,
363 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (D. Minn. 2005); Miranda v. Nielson, CV 09-8065-PHX-PGR,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122933 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2009); Bustamante v. Valenzuela,
715 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Ariz. 2010). Tribes also impose non-incarceration penalties
such as community service, restitution, or probation. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra
note 35, at 6; see also Amber Halldin, Restoring the Victim and the Community: A
Look at the Tribal Response to Sexual Violence Committed by Non-Indians in Indian
Country Through Non-Criminal Approaches, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1 (2008). Again, however, none of these sanctions can apply to non-Indian offenders. See discussion supra
Part I.C.
299. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.07, at 763. Even before the TLOA,
tribal police and state law enforcement officers have worked together to combat reservation crime. See Richmond, supra note 32. FBI agents have also formed task forces
with local tribes to deal with reservation crime. See id. Perhaps even more promising,
in Wisconsin in 2009, eight tribes joined together with Wisconsin law enforcement
officials to form a multi-tribe and state law enforcement task force labeled the Native
American Drug and Gang Initiative (NADGI). Id. NADGI is the first such program
in the nation and participants hope that it becomes a model for other states. Id. Generally, it is believed that such cooperative arrangements aid law enforcement. However, attempts to join forces with local law enforcement are not always warmly
received, with some local officials refusing to cooperate. Legal Hurdles, supra note 23.
For instance, one attempt to join Wisconsin tribes in a law enforcement task force met
with some resistance when a tribe insisted that other task force members abide by its
ordinances on its reservation lands and prohibited task force officers from conducting
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impedes rather than aids in law enforcement efforts. For instance, in one
case an Indian woman called the police after she was assaulted to say that
her attacker was hiding in her closet.300 When a victim’s advocate arrived,
she found four different law enforcement agencies in front of the house
with the victim, arguing over who had jurisdiction to apprehend her assailant.301 Under the TLOA, tribal officers could be designated as serving
any of those agencies in addition to their tribal governments. Stereotypical jurisdictional squabbles flare up in encounters between all law enforcement agencies.302 Any predisposition to territoriality is only
compounded by the jurisdictional rules that make it difficult for law enforcement agencies to determine who has proper jurisdiction, especially
given the myriad law enforcement agencies that may have responsibilities
on any particular reservation.303 Tribal officers operating under a Special
Law Enforcement Commission could be caught in the middle of a confused jurisdictional spat, attempting to satisfy multiple—and possibly
conflicting—sets of priorities. The fragmenting of law enforcement responsibility also undermines the credibility of tribal law enforcement by
suggesting to citizens that tribal police are not competent or credible protectors of their communities without federal assistance or sponsorship.304

investigations or making arrests without a tribal officer’s participation. Richmond,
supra note 32. Local officers may question the competency of tribal police or be reluctant to share responsibilities with officers who are not in their chain of command.
Legal Hurdles, supra note 23. The extent of resistance can be extreme. One sheriff in
Ada, Oklahoma, told his deputies that they were not to call on tribal law enforcement
even if they found themselves wounded and “bleeding to death” on the side of a road.
Id. It is hard to dismiss a perception of racism given such an extreme aversion to
working with Indian police. See id. The TLOA may allay some of these concerns,
however, by providing more thorough training for tribal police officers.
300. Legal Hurdles, supra note 23.
301. Id.
302. Richmond, supra note 32; EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 35, at 4 (“Jurisdictional issues present some of the biggest problems in law enforcement
response . . . .”)
303. Blumenthal, supra note 22.
304. The tribes are not without responsibility for the current state of tribal law
enforcement. For decades, there have been efforts to have tribal police take on more
responsibility for reservation law enforcement. Justice Broken, supra note 13. But, the
tribes have not always been willing to fund these efforts or to fully professionalize its
police force. Id. Some tribes may not be willing—or may simply be financially unable—to pay for increased tribal law enforcement. Id. Thus, better funding for law
enforcement and functioning tribal economies are essential for tribal jurisdiction to
have a real effect on reservation crime. That topic is outside the scope of this article.
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IV. CUTTING THE KNOTS
Despite the devastating effects the current unworkable jurisdictional
scheme has on reservation life, the TLOA ignores the most obvious solution, which is to authorize tribal governments to prosecute reservation
crime regardless of the offense or perpetrator.305 Tribal governments and
tribal law enforcement are most familiar with the culture of the particular
tribe. Further, because their political and personal fates are tied to their
reservation communities, they can be held more directly accountable to
those communities. This is the approach sought by many tribal leaders,306
and it is one at least contemplated by the TLOA, which recognizes that
“tribal law justice systems are ultimately the most appropriate institutions
for maintaining law and order in tribal communities.”307 Nevertheless, this
is a solution that Congress may be reluctant to grant because of fears that
tribal courts cannot provide adequate justice to nonmembers.308 The two
primary legal impediments can be overcome if Congress chooses to act.309
The main impediment to tribal jurisdiction has been concern that
accused defendants would not have the benefit of the full panoply of con-

305. See Pacheco, supra note 18, at 39–41; Eid, supra note 20, at 44–46 (describing possible “post-Oliphant” world); see also Ennis, supra note 148, at 579–80
(describing the flaws in the consent theory of tribal jurisdiction).
306. See Bill Bolsters Tribal Power, supra note 259; see also Eid, supra note 20, at
44–45 (discussing support for efforts to repeal Oliphant to permit tribal jurisdiction
over more offenses).
307. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a)(2)(B), 124
Stat. 2258, 2262. Nevertheless, the TLOA leaves the current complex of jurisdictional
rules intact. Instead, the TLOA establishes an “Indian Law and Order Commission,”
which is tasked with undertaking a comprehensive study of criminal justice in Indian
Country, including a review of the impact of jurisdictional complexities on investigation and prosecution of reservation crime. Sec. 235, § 15(a), (d), 124 Stat. at 2282.
After this study, the Commission is to make recommendations based on its findings
including consideration of simplifying jurisdiction over crimes on reservations. Sec.
235, § 15(e), 124 Stat. at 2284.
308. See Bill Bolsters Tribal Power, supra note 259. For their part, many tribes
have long sought to manage their own tribal judiciaries. Shane Benjamin, Tribes Fight
for Judicial Independence, DURANGO HERALD, June 14, 2009. In calling for judicial
autonomy, some tribes seek to implement a more culture-bound approach to criminal
justice. For example, rather than imposing prison terms, sentencing offenders to sweat
lodges. Id. Still others would continue with the western model, but seek expanded
jurisdictions to prosecute serious offenses. Id.
309. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978), superseded in part by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as stated in United States v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193 (2004) (noting that jurisdiction was not proper without express grant
from Congress). There are, of course, economic and political impediments, but those
are not the focus of this article.
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stitutional rights guaranteed by the Constitution.310 This concern arises
because tribal governments are not bound by the Bill of Rights.311 Instead, tribal courts must comply with ICRA.312 Passed in 1968, ICRA extends nearly all of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights to tribal
governments.313 In criminal prosecutions, tribal courts must provide most
of the same due process rights defendants receive in federal or state
courts.314 ICRA also provides that defendants can challenge their detention as violative of ICRA through writs of habeas corpus in federal
court.315 ICRA does not, however, require that tribes provide indigent
defendants with a right of appointed counsel.316 This omission has been
310. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211; accord Eid, supra note 20, at 44–45; Ennis, supra
note 148, at 582–83; Wolpin, supra note 150, at 1080; see, e.g., Patience Drake Roggensack, Plains Commerce Bank’s Potential Collision with the Expansion of Tribal Court
Jurisdiction by Senate Bill 3320, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 29, 37–38 (2008).
311. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211; Roggensack, supra note 310, at 37–38; Wolpin,
supra note 150, at 1080. “The United States Constitution, along with the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment, serves to limit federal and state government by,
among other things, countering some of the negative aspects of the state’s allocation
of force.” M. Rhead Enion, Constitutional Limits on Private Policing and the State’s
Allocation of Force, 59 DUKE L.J. 519, 520–21 (2009) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cls. 10–16 (delimiting the military powers of Congress); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (providing
for the writ of habeas corpus); id. art. II, § 4 (allowing for impeachment of executive
officers); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring jury trials in criminal cases); id. art. III, § 3
(limiting the crime of treason); id. amend. IV (limiting searches and seizures); id.
amend. V (requiring due process); id. amend. VI (requiring certain criminal
procedures)).
312. Berger, supra note 124, at 1055; see 25 U.S.C. § 1301–03 (2006).
313. 25 U.S.C. § 1302; see Pacheco, supra note 18, at 19–20.
314. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302. That is, defendants have the right to be represented by
counsel, the right to a jury trial for any offense, the right against self-incrimination,
the right to confront witnesses, the right against double jeopardy, to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure, right to know the charges, and to a speedy trial. See
id. Interestingly, ICRA provides a jury trial for any “offense punishable by imprisonment,” not simply those offenses punishable by more than six-months incarceration.
Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1302, with U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing jury trial only
for offenses punishable by more than six-months incarceration).
315. 25 U.S.C. § 1303; accord Wolpin, supra note 150, at 1080.
316. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1302, with U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and Gideon v.
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The lack of such guarantees can create problems even
when suspects are tried in federal courts, however, if tribal police initiated the investigation or arrest before handing the suspect over to federal authorities. The extent of
the issue depends on when the federal constitutional rights are held to attach. See
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 57, § 9.02, at 750–51 for discussion. Further, ICRA
does not provide for a right of grand jury indictment. However, that is not a right that
has been incorporated as against state governments. See Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 534–38 (1884) (finding that right of grand jury indictment is not incorporated against states under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause). This de-
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cited as a reason to prohibit tribes from prosecuting nonmembers.317 But
Congress could rectify this shortcoming by amending ICRA to include
the right to appointed counsel.318 Indeed, the TLOA requires that tribal
courts provide defense counsel to indigent defendants in conjunction with
increasing the penalties tribal courts may mete out.319
A further concern is that, unlike the Bill of Rights, the rights contained in ICRA and the TLOA are statutory as opposed to constitutional
provisions.320 Nevertheless, in a case where the tribe’s Bill of Rights provided for appointed counsel to indigent defendants, the Ninth Circuit
found that criminal prosecution of a nonmember Indian by a tribal court
does not violate constitutional due process guarantees.321 According to
the court, while the Constitution did not bind the tribes, ICRA “confers
all the criminal protections [defendants] would receive under the Federal
Constitution.”322 Likewise, if Congress amended ICRA to require a right

cision still stands. See Bruce A. Antkowiak, The Rights Question, 58 U. KAN. L. REV.
615, 624 n.35 (2010). Thus, defendants in state criminal courts are equally without a
federal guarantee of that right.
317. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211 (1978), superseded in
part by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as stated in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S.
193 (2004); see Eid, supra note 20, at 44–45 (describing the need for additional protections for defendants in tribal courts as the first step to moving past Oliphant); Roggensack, supra note 310, at 37–38. “The United States Constitution, along with the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, serves to limit federal and state government by, among other things, countering some of the negative aspects of the
state’s allocation of force.” Enion, supra note 311, at 520–21 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cls. 10–16 (delimiting the military powers of Congress); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (providing for the writ of habeas corpus); id. art. II, § 4 (allowing for impeachment of executive officers); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring jury trials in criminal cases); id. art. III,
§ 3 (limiting the crime of treason); id. amend. IV (limiting searches and seizures); id.
amend. V (requiring due process); id. amend. VI (requiring certain criminal
procedures)).
318. See Eid, supra note 20, at 46.
319. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, sec. 234, § 202(c)(2), 124 Stat. 2258, 2280;
accord 155 CONG. REC. S4334 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan). Further, to ensure constitutional protections at the arrest and investigative
stage, Congress could simply vest tribal police officers with federal authority, which
would make them subject to the same Bill of Rights. See Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891,
896–98 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that when tribal officers act under color of state law,
they are bound by same constitutional provisions as state police officers).
320. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 932 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56–57 (1978)). Further, the sole remedy for an
ICRA violation is habeas review. Id. at 932 n.49.
321. Means, 432 F.3d at 935.
322. Id. In so holding, the court also recognized that ICRA does not provide for a
right to grand jury indictment, but noted that right was not implicated in that case. Id.
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to appointed counsel, then defendants in Indian tribal courts would have
the same rights as they would receive in a nontribal court prosecution.
Nevertheless, there remains the problem of a general distrust for the
competency of tribal courts to adjudicate cases involving nonmembers.323
In Oliphant, the Supreme Court expressed its concern that a tribe could
not be fair in its exercise of jurisdiction over nonmembers. According to
the Court, tribal jurisdiction was inappropriate because U.S. “citizens
[must] be protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions on their personal
liberty.”324 This concern, apparently, does not bar tribal jurisdiction over
tribal members, who are also U.S. citizens, because the Court was primarily concerned with the cultural and racial divide between an Indian tribe
and non-Indians.325 Thus, the Court sought to avoid tribal jurisdiction
“over aliens and strangers; over the members of a community separated
by race [and] tradition . . . the restraints of an external and unknown
code. . .which judges them by a standard made by others and not for
them.”326
Despite its concern over subjecting strangers to the jurisdictions of
courts with which they were unfamiliar, the Supreme Court has declined
to review a decision which held that a tribe had jurisdiction over a nonmember.327 In Means v. Navajo Nation, Russell Means, an Oglala Sioux,
challenged his conviction by a Navajo tribal court for battery against his

323. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210–11 (1978), superseded in part by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as stated in United States v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193 (2004) (expressing concern that non-Indians would be subjected to tribal
laws and procedures with which they were unfamiliar); Berger, supra note 124, at
1055–58 (describing Oliphant’s distrust); Roggensack, supra note 310, at 38–41
(describing why tribal criminal jurisdiction should be limited). While the concern
about prosecuting non-Indians in tribal courts is perhaps understandable, there is also
cause for concern about bias against Indian offenders or victims in federal court. In
one case brought in state court against two men who raped, beat, and then threw the
victim off a bridge, the jury was unable to reach a verdict. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
supra note 35, at 5. When asked why, a juror replied that the victim “was just another
drunk Indian.” Id. Later, the case was retried and one perpetrator—who had raped at
least four women previously—was sentence to sixty years in prison. Id. His accomplice received a ten-year sentence. Id.
324. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210; see also Ennis, supra note 148, at 555 (discussing
Oliphant’s concern over limits on constitutional protections in tribal courts).
325. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210–11. But see Roberts, supra note 31, at 558–59 (discussing due process implications of subjecting nonmember Indians to tribal jurisdiction where they would not receive full due process protections).
326. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (quoting Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571
(1883)).
327. Means, 432 F.3d at 924, cert. denied 549 U.S. 952 (2006); accord Roberts,
supra note 31, at 557.
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father-in-law, a member of the Omaha tribe, and his brother-in-law, a
member of the Navajo Nation.328 In his habeas petition, Means contended
that the Navajo tribal court lacked jurisdiction over him because he was
not a member of the Navajo Nation and was not a permanent resident of
the Navajo reservation.329 Although the 1990 ICRA amendments had
granted tribal jurisdiction over “all Indians,” Means contended that because the tribe could not prosecute a similarly situated non-Indian, permitting tribal jurisdiction over an Indian nonmember, ran afoul of the
equal protection provisions in ICRA and the U.S. Constitution.330
In rejecting Means’ petition, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that subjecting a nonmember Indian to tribal jurisdiction was not a
racial classification, but a political one.331 Considering ICRA Amendments in light of the MCA and earlier Supreme Court decisions, the circuit court concluded that criminal jurisdiction over “all Indians” as
provided for by the 1990 amendments, meant to include “all [persons] of
Indian ancestry who are also Indians by political affiliation, not all who
are racially Indians.”332 Although “Means’s equal protection argument
ha[d] real force,” the court nonetheless rejected it on the ground that
“federal statutory recognition of Indian status is ‘political rather than racial in nature.’”333
More importantly, after determining that jurisdiction was premised
on Indian political status rather than race, the court employed the “rational tie” standard articulated in Morton v. Mancari to determine
whether subjecting nonmember Indians to tribal jurisdiction was rationally tied “to the fulfillment of Congress’s unique obligation toward the
328. 432 F.3d at 927.
329. Id.
330. Means, 432 F.3d at 931–33. ICRA amendments, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006),
are also known as the “Duro-fix.” Cordiano, supra note 143, at 265; Roberts, supra
note 31, at 544.
331. Means, 432 F.3d at 930. The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Antelope. 430 U.S. 641 (1977), in coming to its decision. Means, 432
F.3d at 930. In Antelope, the Court considered an equal protection challenge to the
MCA. 430 U.S. at 642. Specifically, the petitioner alleged that prosecution by a tribal
court—instead of by a more favorable state court—violated the Equal Protection
Clause because a similarly situated non-Indian would have been prosecuted under
state law. Id. at 646. In rejecting this challenge, the Court explained that the MCA
applied not because of the petitioners’ “race, but because they were enrolled members of the prosecuting tribe.” Id. However, because the Antelope petitioners were
enrolled tribal members, the Court did not consider whether enrollment was required
for the MCA to apply. Id. at 646 n.7.
332. Means, 432 F.3d at 930 (internal quotations omitted).
333. Id. at 932; see also Morris v. Tanner, 160 F. App’x. 600, 601–02 (9th Cir.
2005) (applying Means to hold tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indian proper).
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Indians.”334 In finding that a rational tie did justify tribal prosecution, the
court first noted that recognizing tribal jurisdiction would further Indian
self-government because tribal jurisdiction was critical to the tribe’s ability to “maintain order within its boundaries.”335 According to the court,
ICRA was intended “to protect Indians and others who reside in or visit
Indian country against lawlessness by nonmember Indians who might not
otherwise be subject to any criminal jurisdiction.”336 This was especially
true given the number of non-tribal members who lived on the Navajo
reservation.337 The court reasoned that if Means were not subject to the
jurisdiction of the tribal court, he would escape prosecution altogether as
there was no federal jurisdiction under the MCA and the state also lacked
jurisdiction.338 Thus, tribal jurisdiction was essential to ensure Means did
not escape criminal responsibility.339 Accordingly, “misdemeanor jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is rationally related to Indian self-government in an area where rapid and effective tribal responses may be
needed.”340
If tribal governments have a rational tie to policing misdemeanor
offenses to maintain order within their borders, they have an even more
compelling interest in prosecuting more devastating offenses like sexual
assault.341 Because non-Indians commit the vast majority of sexual assaults on Indian reservations, the prohibition on tribal authority to arrest
or prosecute non-Indians means that tribes are unable to stop the victimization of Indian women.342 Further, the perpetrators of sexual assault are
largely escaping any prosecution.343 In Means, the court was persuaded by
fact that the federal government would not prosecute Means for battery
334. Means, 432 F.3d at 932–33 (quoting Morton v. Macari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)).
335. See id. at 933.
336. Id. Before the 1990 amendments, members of the Suquamish Tribe testified
before Congress that since the Court’s decision in Duro, “tribal police were openly
taunted, and tribal law flaunted, by nonmember [sic] Indians.” Status of Jurisdictional
Authority in Indian Country, an Assessment of Emerging Issues: Hearing Before the S.
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 102d Cong. 39 (1991) (statement of Georgia George,
Chairperson, Suquamish Indian Tribe).
337. Means, 432 F.3d at 933.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See id. (“The Navajo reservation, larger than many states and countries, has
to be able to maintain order within its boundaries.”); see also Pacheco, supra note 18,
at 1 (describing rape of Indian women as “attacks on the human soul” and likening it
“to the destruction of indigenous culture” as both are “a kind of spiritual death”).
342. See PERRY, supra note 31, at 22 (noting that 80 percent of sexual assault
perpetrators are alleged to be non-Indian).
343. See Pachecho, supra note 18, at 3.
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because it was not a major crime under MCA.344 The court was concerned
that ultimately Means would escape any appropriate punishment.345 But,
even though federal jurisdiction does apply to sexual assault, the reality is
that most assailants do escape prosecution and are left free to continue
preying on Indian women. This result is utterly at odds with the congressional goal of furthering tribal governments’ ability to maintain order
within their boundaries.346 As former U.S. Attorney Troy A. Eid explained, “[t]he law simply does not reflect the federal government’s longstanding policy of promoting tribal self-determination with respect to
other core governmental functions, such as [ensuring public safety].”347
Further, the concern the Oliphant court had for subjecting strangers
to unfamiliar laws and court systems is no more of a concern simply because the accused is non-Indian. There are 562 federally recognized
tribes, each with its own history, culture, and traditions.348 That a person is
Indian does not make him any less a stranger to another tribe’s laws or
courts. Indeed, contrary to the court’s suggestion, Means’ status as an
Indian did not necessarily make him more politically entwined with the
Navajo Nation. Rather, despite living on the Reservation for a decade
before the charged conduct, Means was not a member of the Nation and
was not eligible for membership because he lacked the requisite blood
quantum and because he was an enrolled Oglala Sioux.349 Means had no
say in tribal government and was a political stranger to the Tribe’s laws as
he did not play a role in their enactment and had no political voice
against them. Indeed, Means did not speak the Navajo language.350 According to Means, he could not participate in tribal civic life: he was
barred from holding political office, and from voting in tribal elections.351
344. Means, 432 F.3d at 933.
345. See id.
346. Pacheco, supra note 18, at 3.
347. Eid, supra note 20, at 42; accord Pacheco, supra note 18, at 3.
348. Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, If You Build It, They Will Come: Preserving
Tribal Sovereignty in the Face of Indian Casinos and the New Premium on Tribal
Membership, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 311, 345–46, 345 n.327 (2010).
349. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 4, Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924
(2002) (No. 05-1614), 2006 WL 1696525 at *12. (citing Navajo Nation Code tit. 1,
§ 701–03).
350. Means, 432 F.3d at 927–28.
351. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 349, at 4–5. The Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that the Navajo Supreme Court had found that Means could have
served on tribal juries if he had registered to vote in Arizona. Means, 432 F.3d at 928.
In addition, during the time Means resided on the Reservation and was married to a
tribal member, he was connected by rights and obligations to his wife’s “clan” as a
“hadane,” or in-law. Id. However, at the time of the charged offense, Means was no
longer married to a Navajo member and no longer resided on the Reservation. Id. at
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Means contended that he was essentially treated the same as any nonIndian, nonmember residing on the Reservation.352
Nevertheless, the court found tribal jurisdiction proper because of
the Tribe’s need to deter violence committed on its reservation by all
those who reside or visit there.353 This concern is of particular importance
given reservation demographics. Currently, the average Indian reservation has more non-Indian residents than Indian residents.354 On some of
the most populous reservations, the vast majority of the reservation’s residents may be nonnative.355 Further, reservations that employ non-Indian
workers or operate casinos or other businesses open to the public also
have countless non-Indian visitors each day. Additionally, crime reports
suggest that policing non-Indian residents or visitors is essential to combating reservation crime.356 For instance, reports of sexual assault indicate
that more than 80 percent of perpetrators are alleged to be non-Indian.357
Given these demographic realities, prohibiting tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians means tribes are powerless to arrest or prosecute those most
927. Further, as the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the Navajo Supreme Court had noted
that being “a ‘hadane’ does not make one a Navajo.” Id. at 928.
352. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra not 349, at 4–5. In Oliphant, the Court
had been concerned that the Suquamish Tribe did not permit non-Indians to serve on
criminal jury panels. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1978),
superseded in part by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as stated in United States v.
Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). However, since that time, “many tribal courts . . . now
require a ‘fair cross-section of the community’ standard for jury selection and service.” Eid, supra note 20, at 46.
353. Means, 432 F.3d at 933. It was also important to the court that the Navajo
Nation had a sophisticated court system and that there was no other avenue for prosecution because the charged offense was not included in the MCA, so federal jurisdiction did not apply. Id. As noted earlier, one bar to all tribes having competent court
systems is financial. See supra note 304.
354. Berger, supra note 124, at 1071; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Addressing
the Epidemic of Domestic Violence in Indian Country by Restoring Tribal Sovereignty,
ADVANCE, Spring 2009, at 32, 35 (“Large numbers of people who are not tribal citizens reside or conduct business in Indian Country, or have Indian spouses and intimate partners who reside there.”), available at http://www.acslaw.org/Advance%20
Spring%2009/ACS_Advance_v3n1.pdf; Roberts, supra note 31, at 541 (“[A]s of 1990
on the average reservation, non-Indians made up almost half of the total population,
and ‘on nine of the most populated reservations, non-Indians vastly outnumbered
Indians.’ ”).
355. Berger, supra note 124, at 1071; see also Fletcher, supra note 354 at 35; Roberts, supra note 31, at 541.
356. See Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity,
and the Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 596 (2010) (noting
that lack of jurisdiction over non-Indians leaves tribes powerless and with “little
choice but to allow its territory to be used as a haven for criminal activity”).
357. PERRY, supra note 31, at 22.
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responsible for the epidemic of sexual violence in Indian Country.358 Consequently, tribal law enforcement is hobbled in its efforts to protect Indian citizens from reservation violence.
Regardless whether these sexual predators choose to visit or reside
in Indian Country, they should be subjected to tribal jurisdiction if they
prey on Indian citizens.359 Just as residents of one state can be held to
account for breaking the laws of another state they voluntarily enter,
someone who enters an Indian reservation should be held to account for
the violence he commits there. Even in light of court concerns, Congress
could permit tribes to prosecute all crimes occurring on reservations and
to sentence offenders to appropriate prison terms, while taking appropriate steps to ensure constitutional protections.360 Despite its reluctance,
this is something Congress must do. For too long, tribes have been
stripped of their inherent sovereign responsibility to protect their citizens.361 And clearly, tribal sovereignty is infringed by rules that prohibit
tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed on tribal territory.362 But even
358. Id. at 3–4, 23; see Roberts, supra note 31, at 548–49.
359. At a minimum, tribes must be given full concurrent jurisdiction over the
major crimes listed in the MCA regardless of the status of the offender as an Indian or
non-Indian. As the Ninth Circuit explained in finding tribes retained concurrent jurisdiction over Indians under the MCA, tribal prosecution was necessary because federal
prosecution to that point had been “virtually nonexistent.” Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d
823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995). While that case dealt with larceny, the reality today is that
federal prosecution of sexual assaults on Indian reservations are likewise virtually
nonexistent. Id. (citing & quoting CANBY, supra note 107, at 135). Continuing to bar
tribal jurisdiction means that these crimes will continue to go unpunished. See id. at
825–26 (citing NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION, supra
note 110, at 33–35).
360. See Eid, supra note 20, at 46 (tribal jurisdiction “holds enormous promise for
making Indian country safer for all, provided there is no compromise on protecting
the rights of the accused in federal criminal proceedings”); see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978), superseded in part by statute, 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as stated in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (noting
that tribal jurisdiction could not lie absent express grant of jurisdiction by Congress).
361. See Enion, supra note 311, at 523–24, 536; cf. Anita Fröhlich, Reconciling
Peace with Justice: A Cooperative Division of Labor, 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 271, 285 (2007) (citing Ekkehart Müller-Rappart, International Cooperation in
Prosecution and Punishment, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 913, 913 (M.C. Bassiouni
ed., 2002)). “[T]he power to investigate and prosecute crimes occurring within the
state’s territory is considered a core element of state sovereignty.” Id.
362. As Frederick A. Mann explained,
Jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty, it is coextensive with and, indeed, incidental to, but also limited by, the State’s sovereignty. As Lord Macmillan
said, “it is an essential attribute of the sovereignty of this realm, as of all
sovereign independent States, that it should possess jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial limits and in all cases, civil and criminal,
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more than restoring tribal sovereignty, local control of law enforcement
makes practical sense and is more likely to repair the broken tribal law
enforcement system by placing responsibility for policing Indian communities in the hands of those most accountable to their communities.
V. CONCLUSION
For more than a century, federal officials have held jurisdiction over
major crimes in Indian Country. Today, reservations are facing a crisis.
Indian Country has become a lawless place, where perpetrators of some
of the worst offenses routinely escape any prosecution for their crimes.
Consequently, Indian women experience sexual assault at rates more
than double that of other American women. This crisis is likely to continue as long as tribes must depend on remote federal officials to police
their communities.363 Nevertheless, the TLOA persists in vesting the responsibility of policing reservations in those who are far removed from
the communities that are affected while simultaneously refusing to permit
tribes to more effectively address reservation crime. It is long past time to
untie the jurisdictional knots that bind law enforcement hands, that let
perpetrators escape punishment, and that leave Indian women without
justice.

arising within these limits.” If a State assumed jurisdiction outside the limits
of its sovereignty, it would come into conflict with other States which need
not suffer any encroachment upon their own sovereignty. . . . Such a system
seems to establish a satisfactory regime for the whole world. It divides the
world into compartments within each of which a sovereign State has jurisdiction. Moreover, the connection between jurisdiction and sovereignty is, up to
a point, obvious, inevitable and almost platitudinous, for to the extent of its
sovereignty a State necessarily has jurisdiction.

Frederick A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, in 111 RECUEIL
DES COURS 1, 30 (1964-I) (internal citations omitted).
363. See Eid, supra note 20, at 40, 42; Pacheco, supra note 18, at 4; Rape Cases Go
Uninvestigated, supra note 1. Standing Rock’s tribal leader, Ron His Horse Is Thunder, believes sexual predators will be able to continue to prey on Indian women as
long as the Tribe depends on federal law enforcement to police the Reservation. See
Rape Cases Go Uninvestigated, supra note 1.
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